Thursday, 5 September 2013

Does the Defence Research Establishment or Premier Redford when Mr Baconfat and Dean Roger Ray falsely claimed that an RCMP dude named Bill Robinson was my "Handler"

From: David Amos <motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2013 21:30:00 -0300
Subject: Does the Defence Research Establishment or Premier Redford
when Mr Baconfat and Dean Roger Ray falsely claimed that an RCMP dude
named Bill Robinson was my "Handler"
To: "Errington.john" <Errington.john@forces.gc.ca>, "BARRY.SHAW"
<BARRY.SHAW@forces.gc.ca>, bairdj <bairdj@parl.gc.ca>, dnd_mdn
<dnd_mdn@forces.gc.ca>, "craig.dalton" <craig.dalton@forces.gc.ca>,
sunrayzulu <sunrayzulu@shaw.ca>, "rod.knecht"
<rod.knecht@edmontonpolice.ca>, "David.Veitch"
<David.Veitch@edmontonpolice.ca>, "roger.l.brown"
<roger.l.brown@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, "john.warr"
<john.warr@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, "bernadine.chapman"
<bernadine.chapman@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, "ian.fahie"
<ian.fahie@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, "Kevin.leahy" <Kevin.leahy@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>
Cc: BillRobinsonCanada@yahoo.ca, Bret.Mitchell@mynslc.com, ddexter
<ddexter@ns.sympatico.ca>, Bill.Robinson@aglc.ca,
jody.korchinski@aglc.ca, David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>,
daniel.allain@anbl.com, premier <premier@gnb.ca>, austin
<austin@blacktoppaving.ca>, ssamson <ssamson@sylvanlake.ca>,
valerielmeredith <valerielmeredith@aol.com>, "Gary.Rhodes"
<Gary.Rhodes@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, pm <pm@pm.gc.ca>, paul
<paul@paulfromm.com>, "debgrey@gmail.com" <debgrey@gmail.com>, Mackap
<Mackap@parl.gc.ca>, stoffp1 <stoffp1@parl.gc.ca>, premier
<premier@gov.ab.ca>, deanr0032 <deanr0032@hotmail.com>

Do you really think that I do not study my foes?

Remember Vals Minority Report?

Now there is a rare document EH Stevey Boy Harper? Feel free to scroll
down to review

http://baconfat53.blogspot.ca/2013/09/the-defense-research-establishment.html

https://aglc.ca/aboutus/CEO.asp

http://www.calj.org/AboutUs/CALJBoardofDirectors.aspx

http://albertaventure.com/2012/09/former-mountie-bill-robinson-takes-over-alberta-gaming-and-liquor-commission/

Former Mountie Bill Robinson takes over Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission
Former Manitoba Commanding Officer has 34 years of experience in Alberta

Well I am sure that the CSE knows there are at least TWO Bill
Robinsons and that I don't like either one The RCMP knows nobody can
"handle" mean old me. It goes under the heading of what is written on
my Yankee licence plates "Live Free Or Die"

Notice that Billy Baby Robinson deletes my comments just like you DND
dudes do? Does he really think the CSE did save the webpage just like
I did?

http://luxexumbra.blogspot.ca/2009/04/march-cse-staff-size.html

Lux Ex Umbra
Monitoring Canadian signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities past and
present.

Thursday, April 30, 2009
March CSE staff size
1634.

(If you click through on the link and get a different figure, it's probably
because the Canada Public Service Agency has updated its website; they
update the numbers once a month.)

posted by Bill Robinson at 12:36 PM

1 Comments:

David Raymond Amos said...

You may enjoy this FED Disinfo

http://baconfat53.blogspot.com/2009_11_01_archive.html

Tuesday, April 28, 2009
David Raymond Amos Rat and Child molester

David Raynond Amos is ...a rat. He has been long subborned by his case
officer Bill Robinson(Cpl) National Security. To what purpose I do not know.
David Rayond Amos is a paid confidential informant of the RCMP, and has a
sealed criminal record re child molestation.

Mr Amos thinks the more names he calls people, the more poorly spelled
posts, publishing people's phone numbers, and stalking people ...he will
gain some sort of crediblity and thus cash.

Mr. Amos has a long and chequered history of vitirol, vituperation, child
molestation and now being an informant in thrall to the RCMP.

Dean Ray has been turned. Dean owes his life to elements of Freemasonery.
Dean is bait. Bait to see if there are any balanced or really dangerous
people in the anti-mason subculture. Dean Ray has provided intel that has
resulted in the termination with extreme prejudice of Messers Pryor and
Cook.

Teslacoils, imbackteslacoils, ray dean, dean ray etc are all names this
person has used from his home in rural Alberta near Kingman,Hay Lakes, Lake
Miquelon near Camrose. This person is so entirely adicted to perscription
drugs he has become incompetant. Any time you see a video or posting
anywhere by him you should know he is bait.

Anyone affiliated with freemason watch, gangstalking world, storm front or
any of the truth-net should not communicate with Dean, nor David Amos in New
Bruswick.

Posted by Seren at 10:37 AM 0 comments


Friday, August 14, 2009

What does Amerika, the "Truther" movment, "God" and retards have to do with
Canada

We do not have to worry about comment from Little Dean and Dave...they are
to uneducated to understand most posts

So have you seen them, been annoyed or insulted by them, have you smelled
their disease? Have you ever crossed the "medicine line" and seen some Yank
being taken into custody because he just has..."this constitutional right to
bear arms"...in Canada. I remember years ago when the debate was on in
Canada, about there being weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Our American
'friends" demanded that Canada join into "the Coalition of the Willing.

American "veterans" and sportscasters loudly denounced Canada for NOT buying
into the US policy. At the time I was serving as a planner at NDHQ and with
24 other of my colleagues we went to Tampa SOUCOM HQ to be involved in the
planning in the planning stages of the op....and to report to NDHQ, that
would report to the PMO upon the merits of the proposed operation.

There was never at anytime an existing target list of verified sites where
there were deployed WMD. Coalition assets were more than sufficient for the
initial strike and invasion phase but even at that point in the planning, we
were concerned about the number of "boots on the ground" for the occupation
(and end game) stage of an operation in Iraq.

We were also concerned about the American plans for occupation plans of Iraq
because they at that stage included no contingency for a handing over of
civil authority to a vetted Iraqi government and bureaucracy. There was no
detailed plan for Iraq being "liberated" and returned to its people...nor a
thought to an eventual exit plan.

This was contrary to the lessons of Vietnam but also to the military
thought, that folks like Colin Powell and "Stuffy" Leighton and others
illucidated upon. "What's the mission" how long is the mission, what
conditions are to met before US troop can redeploy?

Prime Minister Jean Chretien and the PMO were even at the very preliminary
planning stages wary of Canadian involment in an Iraq operation....History
would prove them correct. The political preesure being applied on the PMO
from the George W Bush administration was onerus

American military assets were extremely overstretched, and Canadian military
assets even moreso It was proposed by the PMO that Canadian naval platforms
would deploy to assist in naval quarantene operations in the Gulf and that
Canadian army assets would deploy in Afghanistan thus permitting US army
assets to redeploy for an Iraqi operation....

The PMO thought that "compromise would save Canadian lives and liberal
political capitial.. and the priority of which ....not neccessarily in that
order. Essentially Canada detemined to stay out of Iraq, paid the price, of
a larger role in Afghanistan to enable US military assets to redeploy to
Iraq.

The US op in Afghanistan evolved from a US op, to a UN op, to a NATO / ISAF
op. NATO countries other than Canada and the UK shun combat operations in
Afghanistan..their rules of deployment and engagement mitigate against NATO
troops engaging the Taliban. By design I am quite sure.

But now the American Iraq op, is a great success. The "surge" worked. But
alas now 127 Canadian soldiers are dead. The 2011 deadline is coming
nigh....and President Barak Obama and NATO want Canada to consider extending
the deployment of Canadian troops. The motives are different. The US wants
to... needs to, as matter of national security, to defeat insurgency in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our European allies want Canada to remain and
continue to "punch above its weight" so European soldiers do not have to
actually fight or die.

That begs a few questions: "Nations do not have friends, nations have
interests" -Henry Kissinger. Is American national security re terrorism in
Afghanistan and Pakistan compatable with Canadian national interests? If
this country, Canada is going to be a continuing ally in "the war against
terror"....should not our "friends and neighbours across the medicine line
be more amenable in matters of trade, or just living up to their free trade
agreements. If our "friends and neighbours" to the south want Canadians to
fight side by side...maybe that 7 % Softwood lumber tariff was a
mistake...or the buy American provision in the currant stimulus plan ought
to be re thought.

Our American "friends" give Israel roughly 3 billion dollars a year to be
spent buying weapons systems from US defense contactors...to survive (both
Israel and US defense industries) Perhaps US dollars should flow to Canada
to buy weapons systems and patrol aircraft and naval platforms...after all,
aren't we your "friends and allies"?

There is nothing similar with American culture, and politics between Canada
and the US. Canada evolved into nation status and the US, revolted
violently. This difference in the means we became nations...has greatly
defined who and what we are.

Our American "friends" look upon Canada as cultural, economic and political
satrap.... Now to their great consternation they are finding out... that is
NOT the case . Nothing good came to Canada by way of America. The military
"schewir punct" should be defense of our continental shelf and the arctic.

Canada does need to stop shipping unrefined bitumen to the US and totally
refine it here and start building a pipeline for bitumen to Canada's west
coast to sell to Asian and the Chinese market. It is more than past time to
understand ..our American "friends" are not our friends at all.

Or else it is: Bend over here it comes again.....KY anyone?

Posted by Seren at 11:27 AM 1 comments



----- Original Message -----
From: "David Amos" <motomaniac333@gmail.com>
To: "Errington.john" <Errington.john@forces.gc.ca>; "BARRY.SHAW"
<BARRY.SHAW@forces.gc.ca>; "bairdj" <bairdj@parl.gc.ca>; "dnd_mdn"
<dnd_mdn@forces.gc.ca>; "craig.dalton" <craig.dalton@forces.gc.ca>;
"sunrayzulu" <sunrayzulu@shaw.ca>; "rod.knecht"
<rod.knecht@edmontonpolice.ca>; "David.Veitch"
<David.Veitch@edmontonpolice.ca>; "roger.l.brown"
<roger.l.brown@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>; "john.warr" <john.warr@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>;
"bernadine.chapman" <bernadine.chapman@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>; "ian.fahie"
<ian.fahie@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>; "Kevin.leahy" <Kevin.leahy@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>
Cc: "David Amos" <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>; "austin"
<austin@blacktoppaving.ca>
Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2013 3:30 AM
Subject: Hmmm Defence Research Establishment-Ottawa But these pals of yours
are on Edmonton time EH Mr Baconfat


Just Dave
By Location Visit Detail
Visit 20,050
Domain Name gc.ca ? (Canada)
IP Address 131.137.245.# (Defence Research Establishment-Ottawa)
ISP Defense Research Establishment
Location Continent : North America
Country : Canada (Facts)
State/Region : Ontario
City : Ottawa
Lat/Long : 45.4167, -75.7 (Map)
Language English (U.S.) en-us
Operating System Microsoft WinXP
Browser Internet Explorer 7.0
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729;
.NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.1)
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Visit Length 33 seconds
Page Views 3
Referring URL http://www.google.ca...g2oCYDw&start=0&sa=N
Search Engine google.ca
Search Words david amos
Visit Entry Page http://davidamos.blogspot.ca/
Visit Exit Page http://davidamos.blogspot.ca/
Out Click View my complete profile
http://www.blogger.c...15428735081915360609
Time Zone UTC-7:00
Visitor's Time Sep 4 2013 11:54:57 am
Visit Number 20,050

http://thedavidamosrant.blogspot.ca/2013/09/yes-lets-do-sum-it-up-to-chagrin-evil.html

http://baconfat53.blogspot.ca/2013/09/to-sum-up.html

Tuesday, September 3, 2013
To sum up!
It is Tuesday, September 3. I am back still traipsing the shallow
end of bureaucratic government, DND officialdom. David Amos is still
unemployed and Mr. Canning, and Leah Parsons is still trying to extend
and parlay their "fifteen minutes of infamy" into something more
profitable. "For the love of God do something..." they cry. Which
translates to, what can we get out of all this.

Since Mr. Canning threatened me with "going national" on his blog,
nothing has occurred. There has been no deluge of e mails to my home,
none actually. NO torrent of comments to by blog, no promised calls
from the "media" or outraged articles or other news stories,
"methinks" Mr. Canning has overstated or exaggerated his importance,
and influence. I am not over surprised.

Rehtaeh Parsons is still dead, a victim of her selfish, addled and
negligent "parents", to allow a fifteen year old child to be a drunk
and promiscuous. According police there are still outstanding photos
or at least one out there.

David Raymond Amos still infects cyber-space threatening retribution,
spam and imaginary litigation upon anyone that annoys or irks him.
From Alison Menard, Robert F. O'Meara, Dan Fouts, Werner Bock, Mark
Carney and the rest of the "snobby British Banksters and politicians,
to our own "Stevie Boy Harper. Honourable mention goes to the unnamed
security constable who David wants his name so he can sue him, for
some arcane reason known only to, and understood by Amos. David Amos'
e communications are blocked and ignored, as the products of
whack-job.

David Amos' "children" Max, and Laura are still hard working
prostitutes, swallowing paste and giving rim jobs for thirty bucks, a
pack of smokes in a pinch. And our "friend" David Amos is still
calling Cruise line a gay chat site for thrills.

Oh dear....The more things change the more they stay the same.

Posted by Seren at 4:23 PM

The monitored inter-net

David Amos was whining about being "blocked" to the Committee to Protect
Bloggers. As I read the articles, there was one about the web being
monitored in the UK and that was a "call to arms" for one blogger.

The "web" in entire world has been monitored for a long time. The UK,
Australia, New Zealand, the US and Canada have employed ECHELON for quite
some time. Canada's CSE ( communications security establishment) has
particular responsiblity for Western Hemishere and South American
communications of all kinds.

Whereas Canada is not as "security conscience" as the UK. The UK has long
been a nation where CCTV is used everywhere monitored everywhere as all
forms of communications. That is mainly to decades of terrorist attacks in
the UK by the IRA, UDF and so on.

For well over ten years in the seventy's and eighty's Arab terrorists
operated in Europe angainst European targets and IDF and Mossad operated in
Europe against the PLO, Black September and a myriad of half baked Arab
organizations.

Europe generally and the UK specifically was well on the way to being a
surveilled society long previous to 9/11. ECHELON has long been used to
monitor the web using it's key word system. About ten years ago the EU
accused the US and UK of using ECHELON to give business interests intel on
EU business interests...toUK / US companies.

It may appear NOW that this coutry is headed in the same direction allbeit
NOW subsequent the Air India bombing and 9/11. But what may be most
concerning is Canadian security is more orientated to assuring our American
cousins their NORTHERN BORDER is secure.

Even today most Americans are under the mis-guided belief the 9/11
terrorists entered the US from Canada. They didn't. That is an issue to all
Canadians because what....1.3 billion dollars of trade crosses the Medicine
Line each day?

That may present a concern or a threat to Canadian liberty and freedom in
the long run. It is indeed interesting to see how far that in a nation known
for the "Canadian compromise" ...is willing to compromise freedoms... for
trade and dollars with our American cousins.

Then of course no ones interests are served by the whining of fuck cunts
like David Amos and little Zorro fag Boy.

Posted by Seren at 2:45 PM 0 comments



Staff of the Parliamentary Information and Research Service (PIRS) of
the Library of Parliament work exclusively for Parliament conducting
research and providing analysis and policy advice to Members of the Senate
and House of Commons and to parliamentary committees on a non-partisan and
confidential basis. The documents on this site were originally prepared for
general distribution to Canadian Parliamentarians to provide background and
analysis of issues that may arise in the course of their Parliamentary
duties. They are made available here as a service to the public. These
studies are not official Parliamentary or Canadian government documents. No
legal or other professional advice is offered by the authors or the
Parliamentary Information and Research Service in presenting its
publications or in maintaining links to other Internet sites.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------


PRB 04-09E
Print version (PDF)

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE RCMP'S
NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
Prepared by:
Tim Riordan Raaflaub
Political and Social Affairs Division
Revised 11 January 2006


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TABLE OF CONTENTS
a.. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
b.. RECENT EVENTS
c.. CANADA'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE - IN BRIEF
d.. REVIEW MECHANISMS FOR CANADA'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
e.. A. RCMP
f.. B. Canadian Security Intelligence Service
g.. C. Communications Security Establishment
h.. REVIEW MECHANISMS FOR CANADA'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES - IN
BRIEF
i.. OPTIONS FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE RCMP'S NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
j.. A. Strengthening the Role of the Commission for Public Complaints
Against the RCMP
k.. B. Establishing a New Review Mechanism for the RCMP
l.. C. Leaving the Existing Review Mechanism for the RCMP Unchanged
m.. SOURCES

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE RCMP'S
NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Prior to 1984, the RCMP Security Service was responsible for providing
security intelligence services to the Government of Canada. However, the
Service's involvement in illegal activities led the Commission of Inquiry
Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (McDonald
Commission) to recommend that a new civilian security intelligence service
be established.(1) Parliament disbanded the RCMP Security Service when it
created the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. CSIS is
subject to a high level of civilian oversight.

On 11 September 2001, terrorists hijacked several aircraft and attacked
civilian and military targets in the United States. These attacks resulted
in a high number of civilian casualties, caused extensive property damage,
and had a disruptive effect on air travel and the global economy.

Following these events, Parliament passed the Anti-terrorism Act. This
statute enacted the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act and
amended 20 other laws. By defining terrorist support as a criminal offence,
it changed the RCMP's role and provided an opportunity for the organization
to be more involved in matters of national security.(2) Further, the RCMP
is to receive $576 million in funding over six years under the Public
Security and Anti-terrorism funding package.(3)

Although Parliament expanded the role of the RCMP, it did not subject its
national security functions to comprehensive civilian oversight. This has
created a disparity between the review mechanisms for CSIS and the RCMP,
whereby the RCMP is subject to less rigorous scrutiny.

RECENT EVENTS
A series of incidents have drawn attention to the expanded role of the RCMP.
American authorities at New York's Kennedy Airport arrested Maher Arar, a
Canadian citizen, on 26 September 2002. Mr. Arar was then deported to
Syria, where he spent 10 months in captivity, and was tortured.(4) It has
been reported that the RCMP provided information to the United States that
may have contributed to his initial detention.(5) The House of Commons
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade attempted to
clarify this point in a series of hearings in the fall of 2003, but had
limited success.(6)

Also, on 21 January 2004, RCMP officers used search warrants issued under
the Security of Information Act to raid the home and office of Ottawa
Citizen reporter Juliet O'Neill. It was reported that they were "looking
for evidence that one of their own officers may have leaked damaging
allegations in the . Maher Arar case."(7)

On 28 January 2004, the Government of Canada announced a public inquiry into
the actions of Canadian officials dealing with the deportation and detention
of Mr. Arar (O'Connor Commission). The terms of reference were issued on 5
February 2004, and included a mandate for the presiding judge to "make any
recommendations that he considers advisable on an independent, arm's length
review mechanism for the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
with respect to national security . ."(8) Commissioner O'Connor has
indicated that he hopes to submit his reports to the government by 31 March
2006. In the National Security Policy released on 27 April 2004, the
Government of Canada pledged to create an arm's-length review mechanism for
the RCMP's national security activities.

A parliamentary review of section 4 of the Security of Information Act,
which pertains to the wrongful communication of secret information, was also
promised in January 2004. However, completion of this review was delayed by
the federal election called for January 2006.

CANADA'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
INFRASTRUCTURE - IN BRIEF
In Canada, numerous federal agencies have national security functions.(9)
Below is a summary of their activities, whether they are involved in
domestic intelligence gathering, and their existing review mechanisms. The
list is not exhaustive, however, and a more comprehensive overview is
available in Chapter 3 of the March 2004 Report of the Auditor General of
Canada.

Table 1: Federal Organizations Charged With National Security
Functions

Name
Activities
Domestic
Intelligence
Gathering
Review Mechanism(s)

Canada Border Services Agency
Collects/analyzes/disseminates intelligence regarding threats
to Canada's immigration/
visitor/refugee/citizenship programs
Yes
None

Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Acquires information
from global information infrastructure
(signals intelligence)
Yes, but only in support of targeting foreign entities outside Canada
CSE Commissioner

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
Collects/analyzes information on security threats to Canada
Yes
Inspector General, CSIS; Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Provides intelligence on
world events to promote and protect Canada's national interests
No
None

Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
Detects and deters
terrorist financing
Yes
None

National Defence
Collects information on
the military capabilities
and intentions of foreign
states and entities
Yes, but
only in rare circumstances
None

RCMP
Investigates criminal activity related to national security
Yes
Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP


There are great disparities among the activities of these organizations.
However, only three of them are subject to review mechanisms. Further,
among those subject to review mechanisms, the extent of scrutiny varies.

REVIEW MECHANISMS FOR CANADA'S
SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
A. RCMP
The RCMP is Canada's national police service. It came into existence in
1920 when the Royal North West Mounted Police and the Dominion Police were
merged into a single entity. The RCMP was involved in the provision of
security intelligence services to the Government of Canada during World War
II. Its security operations were expanded after the war with the
establishment of the Special Branch (1950), the Directorate of Security and
Intelligence (1962), and the Security Service (1970). In 1984, Parliament
disbanded the RCMP Security Service and transferred its functions to the
newly created CSIS.

The RCMP now provides federal police services throughout the country. In
addition, the organization also provides services to provinces, territories,
municipalities and First Nations communities on a contract basis. Passage
of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001 provided an opportunity for the RCMP to be
more involved in matters of national security, as this law defined terrorist
support as a criminal offence.

The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (Commission) was
established by Parliament in 1988. It is an independent civilian body that
reports publicly to Parliament through the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness. The Commission investigates public complaints
regarding the conduct of RCMP members. In most cases, complainants must
first approach the RCMP. However, the Commission Chair does have limited
authority to commence his or her own investigation or may proceed directly
to a public interest hearing. The RCMP is not obligated to follow
recommendations made by the Chair or by a public interest hearing panel.

Shirley Heafey, former Commission Chair, repeatedly called for new powers to
better enable the Commission to review the RCMP's anti-terrorism activities.
This call has been echoed by her successor, Paul Kennedy. A rebalancing of
the relationship between the RCMP and the Commission might also preclude
further litigation between the two bodies regarding the sharing of
information.

B. Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSIS is a civilian agency that does not have any law enforcement powers.
Its role is to "investigate threats, analyze information and produce
intelligence"(10) and it may gather information only on those individuals
and organizations suspected of engaging in espionage and sabotage,
foreign-influenced activities, political violence and terrorism, and
subversion. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act prohibits the
organization from investigating lawful acts of advocacy, protest or dissent.

To ensure an appropriate level of accountability, CSIS activities are
subject to scrutiny by an Inspector General. Appointed by Cabinet, and
answering to a deputy minister, the Inspector General is to be "the Minister's
eyes and ears in the Service . and to maintain an appropriate degree of
ministerial responsibility."(11) The Inspector General is charged with
monitoring compliance with operational policies, reviewing operational
activities, and evaluating reports provided by the Director of CSIS to the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The Inspector General does not accept public complaints. However, he or she
may conduct research and inquiries at the request of the Minister or the
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). The Inspector General is
entitled to have access to all CSIS information except Cabinet documents.
However, he or she may not convene public hearings or make binding
recommendations. In certain cases, the Inspector General's reports are
conveyed through the Minister to SIRC.

SIRC is an independent, external review body that reports publicly to
Parliament through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
on an annual basis. It is empowered to examine CSIS's performance of its
duties and functions, and to investigate complaints made by any person
regarding any act performed by the organization. SIRC is entitled to have
access to all information held by CSIS and the Inspector General except
Cabinet documents, but cannot hold public hearings or make binding
recommendations.

C. Communications Security Establishment
The CSE was established in 1946. Originally, it was the Communications
Branch of the National Research Council. In 1975, however, it was
transferred to the Department of National Defence.

The role of the CSE is to "provide the Government of Canada with two key
services: foreign signals intelligence in support of defence and foreign
policy, and the protection of electronic information and communication."(12)
This role is set out in the National Defence Act.

The Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner was
created in June 1996. The Commissioner is independent and has authority to
review CSE activities to ensure they comply with Canadian law, and
investigate complaints against the agency. Although the National Defence
Act empowers the Commissioner to undertake any investigation that he or she
considers necessary in response to a complaint, only complaints made by
Canadian citizens and permanent residents, including CSE employees, are
accepted at present. The Commissioner has access to all CSE information
holdings; however, he or she may not convene public hearings or issue
binding recommendations.

The Commissioner submits an annual report to the Minister of National
Defence that is tabled in Parliament. Results of reviews of certain CSE
activities are also submitted to the Minister; these, however, are not made
public as they contain secret information.

REVIEW MECHANISMS FOR CANADA'S SECURITY
AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES - IN BRIEF
As noted above, only three of Canada's security and intelligence agencies
have review mechanisms. Below is a summary of their roles, their level of
independence, and the tools they have to carry out their oversight function:

Table 2: Review Mechanisms of Canadian Security and
Intelligence Agencies


Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP
CSIS Inspector General
SIRC
CSE Commissioner

Independent
Yes
No, responsible to Deputy Minister
Yes
Yes

Public report tabled in Parliament
Yes
No, reports to SIRC through
the Minister
Yes
Yes

Accepts public complaints
Yes, but must first complain to RCMP
in most cases
No
Yes, but must first complain to the Director of CSIS
Yes, but accepts complaints only from Canadian citizens and permanent
residents, and CSE employees

Power to undertake own investigations
of complaints
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Power to review agency's duties and functions
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Power to hold public hearings
Yes
No
No
No

Power to make binding recommendations
No
No
No
No


While there are many similarities, the Commission's inability to review the
RCMP's duties and functions, as well as its discretion to convene public
hearings, distinguish it from the other review agencies. It may also be
noted that the Inspector General of CSIS lacks the independence afforded his
or her counterparts.

OPTIONS FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE RCMP'S
NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
A. Strengthening the Role of the Commission
for Public Complaints Against the RCMP
The table above points to a number of similarities between the Commission
and SIRC. Both operate independently, receive public complaints, and have
the power to initiate and conduct their own investigations, and to make
recommendations. Key differences remain, however.

First, SIRC has a broader mandate. The Commission is devoted to receiving
and investigating complaints of misconduct made by members of the public,
while SIRC is charged with reviewing the performance by CSIS of all of its
duties and functions. The receipt and investigation of complaints, while
important, is but one part of a much larger oversight function.

Second, SIRC has broader powers to carry out its mandate. The most
important of these is the right of access to information. The Commission
may have access only to information held by the RCMP that is relevant to a
particular complaint, and this has caused disagreement between the two
organizations. SIRC, however, is entitled to all information held by CSIS
and the Inspector General, except Cabinet documents.

There is a certain logic to the arguments that favour an expansion of the
Commission's role over the establishment of a second review mechanism.
After all, the Commission is well established, already familiar with the
RCMP's duties, functions and organizational culture, and known to the
public. However, care would have to be taken in tailoring any new powers to
the unique circumstances involved in reviewing matters involving national
security. In particular, it might be necessary to review the Commission's
power to convene public hearings, in order to ensure that the existing
legislative safeguards are sufficient for the full protection of secret
information.

B. Establishing a New Review Mechanism for the RCMP
Alternatively, the Government of Canada could opt for a two-tiered review
mechanism for the RCMP. This mechanism could take a variety of forms,
including:

1.. retaining the Commission in its present form (i.e., primarily a
complaint review mechanism) while granting a new agency powers to review the
RCMP's national security functions;
2.. maintaining the Commission as a review mechanism for most complaints
while granting a new agency powers to review the RCMP's national security
functions and process a limited number of complaints (i.e., only complaints
of misconduct against RCMP personnel involved in investigating matters of
national security);
3.. abolishing the Commission and adopting the model used to review CSIS's
activities
(i.e., an Inspector General or equivalent plus an oversight committee).
It is suggested that in the event that a two-tiered model is selected, care
will have to be taken to ensure that the roles of the two agencies are
complementary.


C. Leaving the Existing Review Mechanism for the RCMP Unchanged
Finally, the Government of Canada could opt to leave the existing structures
in place. After all, the mandate of the Commission does not preclude it
from investigating complaints of misconduct against RCMP personnel involved
in investigating matters of national security.

While the Commission's oversight powers are more limited than those of
either SIRC or the CSE Commissioner, most of the federal departments and
agencies with national security functions currently operate without scrutiny
by any review mechanism. Nonetheless, the RCMP's apparent reluctance to
fully cooperate with the Commission where matters of national security are
involved,(13) coupled with the terms of reference for the O'Connor
Commission and the commitments made by the Government of Canada in the
National Security Policy make the status quo an unlikely choice.

SOURCES
Anti-terrorism Act. 2001, c. 41.

Canada Border Services Agency. Immigration Intelligence - Overview.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Accountability and Review.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23.

Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, 2001, c. 41.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Citizenship and Immigration - CIC's
Role in Public Safety.

Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. Our Process.

Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. Second Report. Volume 1, Minister of Supply and Services,
Ottawa, 1981.

Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. Second Report. Volume 2, Minister of Supply and Services,
Ottawa, 1981.

Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. Third Report. Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa,
1981.

National Defence Act. R.S. 1985, c. N-5.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada. March 2004 Report.

Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner.
Complaints Procedure.

Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner. OCSEC
History.

Privy Council Office. Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security
Policy.

Pue, Wesley. "The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of
Permanent Warfare." Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 41, 2003, pp. 267-292.

RCMP. About the RCMP.

RCMP. Historical Highlights.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act. R.S. 1985, c. R-10.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public Complaints Commission v. Attorney
General of Canada. 2004 FC 830.

Security Intelligence Review Committee. About SIRC.

"Suit alleges RCMP stonewalling probes." Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 30
January 2004.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) Patrick J. Smith, "Anti-Terrorism and Rights in Canada: Policy
Discourse on the 'Delicate Balance,'" Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1
and 2, Winter/Spring 2003, p. 141.

(2) Office of the Auditor General of Canada, November 2003 Report,
Chapter 10, p. 10.128.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Stephen J. Toope, Commission of Inquiry Into the Actions of Canadian
Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, Report of Professor Stephen J. Toope - Fact Finder, 14 October
2005, p. 23.

(5) "CSIS, RCMP alerted U.S. about Arar, Powell says," Globe and Mail
[Toronto], 20 December 2003, A1.

(6) Refer to House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, Evidence, 2nd Session, 37th Parliament, 25
September, 7 October and 4 November 2003.

(7) "Mounties raid journalist in search for Arar leaks," Globe and Mail
[Toronto], 22 January 2004, A1.

(8) Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, News Release,
"Deputy Prime Minister Issues Terms of Reference for the Public Inquiry into
the Maher Arar Matter," Ottawa, 5 February 2004.

(9) Office of the Auditor General of Canada, November 2003 Report, p.
10.121.

(10) Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Role of CSIS.

(11) Smith (2003), p. 147.

(12) Communications Security Establishment, About CSE.

(13) Shirley Heafey, Civilian Review of the RCMP's National Security
Activities, 3 October 2005.



Canada's Spy Agency from the Inside

A state worthy of the name has no friends - only interests.- French
President Charles de Gaulle, 1962, paraphrasing Britain's Lord Palmerston,
1848



The agency's name is absent from the address board in the lobby. But on the
fifth floor of an unassuming office tower at Ottawa's Billings Bridge
Plaza - right beside a local Zellers - are several sub-offices of the
Communications Security Establishment, Canada's most secret and
least-accountable spy service. "Communications Security Establishment?" asks
an Ottawa directory assistance operator. "We don't have a telephone listing
under that name." The faxes that the CSE sends do not carry a return fax
number. Its letterhead address is the anonymous sounding P.O. Box 9703.

In fact, the CSE's main headquarters in the Sir Leonard Tilley Building at
719 Heron Rd. houses most of the agency's 875 civilian employees. Many sit
for hours under headphones, gazing at computer screens at desks that are
grouped according to the regions of the world whose airwaves they monitor
electronically. Here, mathematicians and linguists, political scientists and
engineers collect and analyse foreign signals intelligence - known as
SIGINT - for the CSE's "clients": the Prime Minister, the department of
foreign affairs and international trade and other government departments.
Set up in 1941 to decode enemy telegraphy and radar, the service's
technology has now evolved to cover cellular telephones, faxes and even
emissions from computer screens or electric typewriters. "There isn't a
thing that's radiating that they can't get," says Mike Frost, a former
undercover agent with the service.

While most Canadians are aware of the domestic security activities of the
12-year-old CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, few had heard of the
foreign-focused CSE before 1994, when Frost published his Cold War memoir of
19 years at the agency. Then, last November, former CSE linguist Jane
Shorten revealed on national television that Canada had, since 1990, also
spied on friendly nations Japan and South Korea for economic reasons, as
well as on free-trade partner Mexico during negotiations leading up to the
1992 North American Free Trade Agreement. "My colleagues who were Spanish
linguists were working really hard at that, doing extra hours," remembers
Shorten. Indeed, the CSE has, in one guise or another, conducted electronic
eavesdropping on a global basis since the Second World War, with virtually
no parliamentary oversight. The first time the government publicly
acknowledged the agency's existence was in 1983.

Shorten and Frost are the only former employees who have risked breaking
their pledge under the Official Secrets Act to speak publicly about the
surveillance agency. Lawyers correctly predicted that the CSE would rather
ride out a few days of bad publicity than face more information coming out
during a trial. Although the two support Ottawa's involvement in
intelligence-gathering, both came to believe that the CSE's activities cross
the line of what is acceptable. "It was going into the privacy of Canadians'
communications," Shorten says. "I was getting physically sick over it. It
was so stressful." Frost says he was coming out of an alcoholism recovery
program when the agency retired him six years ago - his office already
cleaned out and locks changed before he even heard his fate. All prospective
CSE employees undergo an exhaustive security check before joining the
agency. Once hired, they are not allowed to talk about their work, to travel
abroad without filing an itinerary or to move in with a romantic partner
without reporting it to superiors. Frost says his family life suffered from
his clandestine work +setting up signal-collection stations at Canadian
embassies around the world - among them Moscow, Bucharest, Caracas and New
Delhi.

In his book Spyworld: How C.S.E. Spies on Canadians and the World,
co-written with Michel Gratton, a former spokesman for former prime minister
Brian Mulroney, Frost also describes more dubious operations: eavesdropping
on Margaret Trudeau in 1975 to find out if she smoked marijuana; monitoring
two of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher's dissenting cabinet
ministers in London on behalf of Britain's secret service; and collecting
information about Quebec separatism - chiefly by tapping into the Parti
Québécois government's communications with France and other countries - in a
section known as "the French Problem." CSE has roundly denied the Quebec
claims, a rare departure; otherwise, it has issued a terse "no comment" to
assertions by Frost and others. Allegations are virtually impossible to
confirm independently, since every operation the agency carries out is known
only to those who work on it. Says Shorten: "The person down the hall, you
don't know what they're doing. It's all on a need-to-know basis." Citing
policy and national security, the CSE declined a Maclean's request for
interviews and said it had chosen not to respond to any of the 32 questions
the magazine submitted by fax.

For Shorten, the moment of truth came in 1991, some time after she
transferred from the Russian section to N2, or "rest of the world." Her job
was to translate South Korean "intercept" as part of a project code-named
Aquarian. At first, Shorten scanned diplomatic communications - Korean
reaction to meetings with Canadian trade officials about the CANDU nuclear
reactor, for example. Then, her tasks changed to include monitoring all
telephone and fax traffic in and out of the South Korean Embassy in Ottawa,
which included conversations of locally hired Canadian staff. "That's where
I drew the line," says Shorten. "I said 'Look, this is Canadian content
now,' because anyone could phone up the South Korean Embassy and I would
have it on tape." Shorten says she clashed with her supervisor when she
expressed discomfort with the work and asked for guidelines on what to
report.

One of the first things Shorten heard was a conversation between a Canadian
woman and her doctor about gynecological problems. "I was just appalled. I
talked to the senior linguist and said, 'I can't believe this, it's
outrageous, I shouldn't be listening to this.' " Ultimately, after a
prolonged leave of absence, Shorten was officially dismissed in 1994.

Frost, who now travels the country speaking to luncheon groups about
Canadian intelligence issues, insists it was a sense of ethics that moved
him to disclose the questionable CSE capers that he knew of. "If the
taxpayers are paying three quarters of a million dollars a day for it,
Canadians have a right to know," he says. The CSE's official budget, buried
within the defence department's financial figures, is $116.8 million this
year. But the military provides an additional 1,100 people and much
equipment, bringing CSE's employee count to within about 100 of CSIS's 2,077
and its total expenditure - estimated at nearly $250 million - to 1 ½ times
the current CSIS outlay. The CSE's formidable resources include a Cray
supercomputer, which at the time of purchase in 1985 was the most powerful
data-cruncher in the country. After upgrades and maintenance, CSE had, by
1994, spent more than $34 million on that machine alone. Despite the end of
the Cold War and government belt-tightening, a $35-million, windowless
extension to the main CSE building was completed in 1992, creating what is
known in spy circles as a "Tempest-proof" structure, impenetrable to outside
surveillance equipment. Connected by an underground tunnel is yet another
smaller building where experts on codes and ciphers work on securing all
Canadian government communications against interception. That division,
known as INFOSEC, accounts for about 20 per cent of the CSE's total
operations, officials have said in the past.

It is impossible to know the current budget breakdown. Unlike CSIS, which
was set up under an act of Parliament and is answerable to an independent
review committee, the CSE has no mandate beyond one paragraph in a 1975
cabinet order. It also had no system of review until Defence Minister David
Collenette appointed a watchdog commissioner in June, after years of outside
pressure. The agency's current chief, Stewart Woolner, answers to Margaret
Bloodworth, deputy clerk of the Privy Council Office, on matters of policy,
and to Collenette on its budget. But defence ministers - some by their own
admission - have most often been outside the loop. "In theory, the minister
of national defence is accountable to the House of Commons for the money.
But on a day-to-day basis, he or she would never be involved in the
operations," says Derek Lee, Liberal MP for Scarborough/Rouge River, one of
those who has pushed for an accountability mechanism.

Now, former Quebec chief justice Claude Bisson has just set up an office in
downtown Ottawa with three newly hired staffers to help him in his part-time
position as CSE commissioner. Bisson, who has a budget of $500,000, is to
report annually to Collenette, who will in turn report to Parliament. A
veteran of three judicial inquiries, Bisson is supposed to make sure the CSE
stays within the law and does not abuse its considerable power. But already
critics have complained that the new measure does not go far enough. "I
don't have high hopes," says Shorten. "If something is in the interest of
national security, it may not all be reported. They always get out of it
with 'national security.' " Bisson confirmed he must first vet his reports
with Bloodworth, who acts as deputy minister for CSE, before he submits
them, but he insists he does have some clout. "Everything is supposed to be
open to me," Bisson says, adding that he will alert the attorney general if
there is something that concerns him.

Bill Robinson, a researcher at the disarmament group Project Ploughshares in
Waterloo, Ont., complains that the commissioner's status is not enshrined in
law, that the job is carried out by one individual rather than an
arm's-length panel, and that his mandate is merely to check legality. "You
can do a significant amount of invading privacy that is legal but isn't
appropriate," says Robinson. "There could be much better safeguards in place
against spying on Canadians."

Government agencies must get a court warrant to tap into telephone calls,
faxes or other "private" communications within Canada. But under
long-existing laws, the CSE needs no court order to monitor text or radio
messages that begin or end outside Canada. The legality of cross-border
telephone eavesdropping is less clear. Another wrinkle is that, even inside
Canada's borders, cellular telephones can legally be intercepted - although
certain uses of gleaned material is unlawful. The privacy of electronic mail
has yet to be legally tested.

Further, even if the CSE operates entirely within the law on Canadian soil,
its close relationship to spy organizations in the United States, Britain,
Australia and New Zealand can still allow it to circumvent the rules. Frost,
for one, says CSE has carried out missions for both London and Washington
that they deemed too delicate domestically to be handled by their own
intelligence agencies. "Why not the reverse, especially in the case of
Quebec?" he asks. He also says the CSE purchased Scandinavian interceptions
of French communications to gain information about Quebec separatists.

Commissioner Bisson, who had hardly heard of the CSE before being asked to
accept his three-year appointment, says this is the type of issue he intends
to examine. "They cannot do indirectly what they are forbidden to do
directly," he asserts. In a rare 1995 appearance before the standing
committee on national defence, Bloodworth reiterated the organization's
standard response to such questions. "CSE does not in any part of its
collection target Canadians, or the communications of Canadians," she said.
"A fundamental part of the agreements we have with our close allies is that
we do not target each other and we do not ask each other to target our own
citizens either."

Still, the practice of exchanging material goes back decades. Until
recently, the CSE functioned as a virtual branch office of Washington's
National Security Agency, which has 38,000 people on its payroll. One large
satellite dish stationed outside the CSE's Ottawa headquarters is dedicated
exclusively to messages to and from NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md.
Numerous CSE employees have done training there. For years, Canada got a lot
more than it gave to the partnership, until increasing pressure from the
NSA, along with bountiful financial and technical inducements, persuaded the
CSE to take a more activist role. By the late 1980s, Canada had become a
major player. During the last few years of the Soviet regime, says Frost,
the CSE even took over the interception of all Moscow-based signals on
behalf of the United States and Britain, whose listening operations in the
capital had been jammed by Soviet intelligence experts.

Ottawa's move to the big leagues may have come in the nick of time. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Bloc six years ago, a higher priority has been
placed on economic intelligence - a sphere where even the best political
allies never give away their secrets. "A few years ago, the CSE had
recruitment ads for university students in psychology and humanities. Now,
they are looking for graduates in economics, commerce and business. Five to
10 years ago, that wouldn't have figured into it," says Reg Whitaker, a
political science professor at Toronto's York University. Whitaker points
out that Shorten's reports of economic spying surfaced at a time when the
government is putting top priority on trade. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
will make his third "Team Canada" deal-making mission to Asia early next
year, this time to the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea.

But in the absence of an obvious enemy like nuclear-armed Soviet communism,
the ethics of modern-day spying are far less clear-cut, as Shorten found.
Today, she remains unemployed and is considering going back to school, to
put her CSE years behind her. "All I wanted to do was show Canadians what
the CSE was all about, and that it is dangerous," she says of her decision
to speak out. "Somebody should be looking over their shoulders."

To be sure, the agency has become slightly more open in recent years. Its
budget has been cut by about 10 per cent since the heady Cold War days,
chief Woolner testified to a parliamentary committee last year. In an effort
to raise funds, the INFOSEC side has begun consulting to the private sector
on how to secure corporate communications. Yet there is no sign - and no
reason to expect - that CSE will curb its increasingly complex operations at
a time when many experts believe the world has in fact become less secure.
Terrorists, organized criminals and money launderers have discovered that
Canada is a choice base from which to run international operations. And, as
Woolner confirmed in his testimony, trade has become a prime component of
the new national interest.

"Knowledge is power," says MP Lee. "When we as Canadians sit down with
another country to negotiate an agreement, our negotiators must be possessed
of as much knowledge as they can get their hands on. There isn't a country
in the world that wouldn't do that." But whether that information should be
obtained meticulously from open sources or gleaned clandestinely is a matter
of debate. To Lee, "Canadians have a sense of morality. They don't want to
be bad guys." He believes they want their spies to obtain "as much
information as they could covertly without breaking major rules or
embarrassing anyone." Perhaps too, many are just as happy that the CSE, with
its troubling tactics, is as secret as it is.

Maclean's September 2, 1996

Author NOMI MORRIS

LUX EX UMBRA
An unofficial look inside the
Communications Security Establishment,
Canada's signals intelligence agency

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bill Robinson
London, Ontario,
Canada
bill@newman-robinson.ca

Recent updates (5 November 2001)

What is the Communications Security Establishment?
Overview and Brief History
Budget
CF Information Operations Group
Policy, Operational and Administrative Control
Mandate
Monitoring of Canadians?
CSE/CFIOG Facilities
New Targets?
Recent Steps Toward Oversight

What is the Communications Security Establishment?
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada's national Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) organization. SIGINT, as defined by the Canadian
government, is ``all processes involved in, and information and technical
material derived from, the interception and study of foreign communications
and non-communications electromagnetic emissions.''[1] Subcategories include
intelligence derived from communications, also known as Communications
Intelligence (COMINT), intelligence derived from non-communications
emissions such as radar, also known as Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and
intelligence derived from the telemetry transmissions of missiles or other
equipment undergoing testing, also known as Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).
Note that SIGINT is restricted to foreign emissions under the Canadian
government definition.

Strictly speaking, CSE is only part of Canada's SIGINT effort. A civilian
agency of the Department of National Defence, CSE processes SIGINT, produces
analyses, and disseminates reports to Canadian and allied consumer agencies.
The actual collection of the SIGINT, however, is conducted by the Canadian
Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG), formerly known as the
Supplementary Radio System (SRS), a component of the Canadian Armed Forces
that operates under the direction of CSE.

CSE and the CFIOG in turn work in close co-operation with the giant American
and British SIGINT agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA) and
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia's Defence Signals
Directorate (DSD), New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB), and a number of other SIGINT agencies in a global intelligence
alliance known informally as the UKUSA community. These allies jointly
operate the ECHELON surveillance system. CSE maintains permanent liaison
officers at NSA HQ at Fort Meade, Maryland (CANSLO/W) and GCHQ in
Cheltenham, UK (CANSLO/L). There are also NSA and GCHQ liaison officers at
CSE HQ (SUSLO/O and BRLO, respectively). For more information about NSA, see
the official NSA homepage or the much more informative Federation of
American Scientists NSA homepage. For more information about GCHQ, see the
official GCHQ homepage or the FAS unofficial GCHQ page. CSE, DSD, and GCSB
also have official homepages.

Overview and Brief History
CSE began existence as the Communications Branch of the National Research
Council (CBNRC). Authorized by Order-in-Council 54/3535, dated 13 April
1946, it was the direct descendent of Canada's wartime military and civilian
SIGINT processing operations, which also had worked in close co-operation
with their American and British counterparts.[2] Officially born on 1
September 1946, it began operations on 3 September 1946.

In 1947, CBNRC began fulfilling the additional responsibility of serving as
the Canadian government's communications-electronic security (COMSEC)
agency. Prior to 1947, the government's encryption systems and keys had been
provided by the United Kingdom. ``This arrangement,'' the History of CBNRC
noted dryly, ``did not guarantee the privacy of Canadian government
classified communications.''[3] CSE continues to bear both SIGINT and COMSEC
responsibilities today (the latter responsibility now encompasses the
somewhat broader category Information Technology Security (INFOSEC)). For
more about CSE's INFOSEC mandate and current INFOSEC activities, see the
official CSE homepage.

On 1 April 1975, CBNRC was transferred from the National Research Council to
the Department of National Defence and its name changed to the
Communications Security Establishment. At the time of its transfer,
CBNRC/CSE had about 590 personnel. A major buildup during the period
1981-1990 left CSE at its current strength of about 900.[4]

An estimate of the number of personnel in each group within CSE is located
on the 1995-96 CSE staff: Breakdown by groups page. Additional information
about CSE's staff is located on the employee strength and authorized
establishment page.

The history of cryptanalysis (codebreaking) at CSE. More about CSE's
history.

The current Chief of CSE is D. Ian Glen (effective 12 July 1999). Under the
Chief are six Directorates (SIGINT Production; Operations; Technology;
INFOSEC; Policy and Plans; and Corporate Services), each headed by a
Director-General. Each Directorate, in turn, contains a number of Groups,
each headed by a Director. An approximation of CSE's overall organization is
depicted in this organization chart.

Budget
CSE's fiscal year 2000-01 budget is reported to be $98.0 million (this
figure does not include the budget of the CFIOG).

The CSE budget appears to have weathered the end of the Cold War remarkably
well. According to the Special Senate Committee on Security and
Intelligence, CSE's 1990-91 budget was $105.1 million (or about $120 million
in year 2000 dollars). If these figures can be taken at face value, it would
appear that CSE's budget is now about 20 percent below its Cold War peak
level. In fact, its budget almost certainly fared considerably better than
these figures would indicate. 1990 was the peak year for CSE's spending on
"Annie," the new wing of the Sir Leonard Tilley building completed in 1992.
The extra funding added for this project may have boosted CSE's budget by as
much as 15 percent over its normal level during that year. Excluding special
projects such as this, CSE's budget may be only about 5 percent below its
Cold War peak.

Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that CSE has faced real budgetary
constraints since the end of the Cold War, the claim that CSE has suffered
significant reductions appears to be a myth. Reallocations from capital and
operations spending have enabled CSE to maintain a staff of 900 full-time
equivalents (FTEs), essentially the same as it had in 1990-91 and 50 percent
more than it had in 1980. Since progress in automation continues to reduce
the number of staff in CSE's Communications Centre and other support areas,
the number of analysts at CSE is actually likely to have increased since the
end of the Cold War.

Supplementary Radio System/CF Information Operations Group
Canada's SIGINT collection (as opposed to processing) has always been
conducted predominantly by military personnel. Small-scale SIGINT collection
for the British Royal Navy began in 1925, but collection for Canadian
processing began with the Second World War. (The officially recognized
birthday of Canada's SIGINT collection service is 8 May 1938, the day the
Minister of National Defence approved the creation of a Canadian "Wireless
Intelligence Service".) All three services operated SIGINT collection
facilities during the war, and all three continued to collect SIGINT after
the war.

A unified collection organization, the Supplementary Radio System (SRS), was
created in 1966 as part of the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. The
mission of the CFIOG/SRS is:

"To operate and maintain Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and
geolocation resources in support of the Canadian cryptologic programme;

"To operate and maintain Canadian Forces radio frequency direction finding
facilities in support of Ocean surveillance, Search and Rescue and other
programmes; and

"To provide Signals Intelligence, geolocation and Electronic Warfare support
to Military Operations, including tactical SIGINT and Electronic Warfare
(EW) support to commanders in the field."

As of the beginning of 1997, the strength of the SRS was reported to be
1025: 112 civilians (mainly support staff at the SIGINT stations) and 913
military personnel.[5] Approximately 785 of the latter were members of the
Communicator Research (291) trade, i.e., the actual intercept operators.
These numbers are down significantly from the beginning of the 1990s, a
result of the end of the Cold War, the closing of the SRS intercept station
at Bermuda, and the conversion of three other intercept stations - Alert,
Gander, and Masset - to remote operations. Initial Communicator Research
training takes place at CFB Kingston.

The Supplementary Radio System was renamed the Canadian Forces Information
Operations Group on 1 April 1998. More information about the SRS/CFIOG can
be found at the Online Oldtimers site.

Information Operations for Canada by Col J.D.R. Bourque contains a CFIOG
organization chart.

Policy, Operational and Administrative Control
The Minister of National Defence is responsible for CSE issues in Cabinet
and in Parliament.[6] "The Minister approves CSE's major capital
expenditures, its annual Multi-Year Operation Plan, and... major CSE
initiatives with significant policy or legal implications."[7]

Control over Canadian SIGINT activities is divided at the bureaucratic
level, however, with policy and operational control exercised by the Deputy
Secretary, Security and Intelligence, in the Privy Council Office, and
administrative control exercised by the Deputy Minister of National Defence:
"The [Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence, formerly the Security and
Intelligence Coordinator] is accountable for CSE's policy and operations,
and the Deputy Minister of National Defence is accountable for
administrative matters affecting CSE."[8]

In exercising policy and operational control, the Deputy Secretary, Security
and Intelligence works under the direction of the Interdepartmental
Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI) and, ultimately, the Minister
of National Defence and Cabinet. "The ICSI maintains general policy control
over all aspects of the collection, processing and dissemination of
SIGINT..."[9] The Chief of CSE is an associate member of the ICSI.[10]

Among its other duties, the Privy Council Office "co-ordinates the Canadian
SIGINT program with other national intelligence activities and formulates
guidance, requirements and priorities for the provision of SIGINT
product."[11] (Some user requirements are also provided to CSE bilaterally
by SIGINT customer departments.)

Administrative control is exercised by the Deputy Minister of the Department
of National Defence.

It is the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence,
"in co-operation with the deputy minister of National Defence, to ensure the
Minister of National Defence [is] knowledgeable about matters of CSE, and
able to respond to any questions that would be put on that subject."[12] In
practice, however, it is likely that few ministers of National Defence ever
obtain a detailed knowledge of the nature and activities of CSE. Former
Minister of National Defence Jean-Jacques Blais has stated, for example,
that "my knowledge of the Communications Security Establishment was very
superficial indeed when I was minister of defence."[13]

Mandate
The formal mandate of CSE is a classified document, presumably approved by
the Cabinet; it has never been laid out in statute. As demonstrated above,
however, the general nature of CSE's mandate is not secret. IAC SIGINT
Memorandum No. 1 confirms that ``the Communications Security Establishment
(CSE) of the Department of National Defence has been established as the
Canadian National SIGINT Centre, and has been given the responsibility for
providing SIGINT to meet the needs of the Federal Government.''[14]

Monitoring of Canadians?
The question most frequently asked about CSE is: does it monitor Canadians?
The public has been assured on a number of occasions that CSE's formal
mandate restricts it to the collection of "foreign intelligence".[15] The
government's definition of SIGINT, quoted at the beginning of this page,
would appear to confirm this assurance.

It is almost certainly significant, however, that the government definition
of "foreign" communications has never been made public; it was deleted in
its entirety from the released version of IAC SIGINT Memorandum No. 1.
Depending on the precise definition that the government uses, such
communications might include:

a.. any communication that originates and/or ends in a foreign country,
regardless of the nationality of its participants;
b.. any communication that involves foreign embassies, foreign-owned
businesses, or other foreign-related activities in Canada, regardless of the
nationality of its participants; and/or
c.. any communication that involves at least one foreign participant.
There is reason to believe that the government's definition does include at
least some of these meanings. For example, then-Solicitor General Robert
Kaplan stated explicitly in his 1984 testimony that CSE could, under certain
circumstances, "intercept signals that begin and end in Canada, that begin
in Canada and end abroad or the reverse."[16]

It would appear, therefore, that CSE's "foreign intelligence" mandate does
permit it to intercept many types of communications that do involve Canadian
participants. In fact, the Department of National Defence has admitted that
CSE occasionally intercepts communications that involve or contain
information about Canadians: "CSE targets only foreign communications,
which, on rare occasions, contain personal information about Canadian
citizens and landed immigrants."[17] In addition, the government has
confirmed that CSE maintains a data bank, DND/P-PU-040, "Communications
Security Establishment Foreign Intelligence Files," that "contains personal
information relating to sensitive aspects of Canada's international
relations, security and defence." (An earlier version of the description
stated more directly that the data bank contains "information concerning
[Canadians] identified as potential risks to national security."[18])

CSE does have privacy policies to minimize inadvertent collection of
Canadian communications and establish guidelines for the use or elimination
of material that is collected. (The details of these policies, and the
exceptions that they may or may not contain, have not been made public,
however.) The CSE Commissioner, an independent overseer appointed in 1996,
has confirmed that in his view CSE's privacy policies are respected. He also
has stated that he is satisfied that "CSE has not targeted the
communications of Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada."
Several former CSE employees have alleged that abuses do occur, however.

CSE/CFIOG Facilities
a.. CSE Headquarters, Sir Leonard Tilley Building, Ottawa (CSE also has
offices in the Edward Drake Building (former CBC headquarters) and the
Insurance Building, and may still have some personnel in the Billings Bridge
Tower (former SBI Building) and the "warehouse" on Merivale Road)
b.. ``Kilderkin'' intercept site, Ottawa (monitors Russian embassy)
c.. CSE intercept sites at Canadian embassies and consulates (locations
secret)
d.. CFIOG Headquarters, Tunney's Pasture, Ottawa
e.. CFS Leitrim, Ontario (just south of Ottawa; operates SIGINT collection
and Pusher HF-DF antennae; also four satellite monitoring dishes; intercepts
diplomatic communications in/out of Ottawa and some satellite
communications; remotely operates SIGINT stations at Alert, Masset, and
Gander)
f.. CFS Alert, Ellesmere Island, Nunavut (operates SIGINT collection and
Pusher high-frequency direction-finding (HF-DF) antennae; intercepts mainly
ex-Soviet air force, air defence force, and other military communications)
g.. CFS Masset Detachment Leitrim, BC (operates SIGINT collection and
AN/FRD-10 HF-DF antennae; intercepts mainly maritime military
communications; part of the US Navy's worldwide BULLSEYE HF-DF net
h.. 770 Communications Research Squadron Detachment Leitrim, CFB Gander,
Newfoundland (operates SIGINT collection and AN/FRD-10 HF-DF antennae;
intercepts mainly maritime military communications; part of the BULLSEYE
net)
i.. 771 Communications Research Squadron, located at CSE HQ, Ottawa
j.. CFIOG Detachment, NSA headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland, USA
k.. CFIOG Detachment, Medina Regional SIGINT Operations Centre (RSOC), San
Antonio, Texas, USA
l.. CFB Kingston, Ontario: E Squadron, CF School of Communications and
Electronics (conducts CFIOG intercept operator training, including Russian
and other language training) and 1 Canadian Division Headquarters and
Signals Regiment
m.. CFIOG members also serve on exchange at various US Navy (Naval
Security Group) BULLSEYE net sites in the United States; a comparable number
of USN personnel serve at Canadian sites.


See also the complete list of postwar Canadian SIGINT sites.

New Targets?
The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union have made CSE's
Soviet military targets less important than they once were. As a result, CSE
has almost certainly been under pressure either to shrink or to find new
targets. Some shrinkage has taken place, but CSE/CFIOG appears to have
survived the end of the Cold War largely intact. This suggests that CSE has
managed to convince the government that SIGINT production remains at least
as important as it was during the Cold War. It is likely that Russia remains
CSE's predominant target, but the agency's gradual move into embassy
collection and the intercept of satellite communications indicates that new
targets have also been added over the past decade, such as "economic
intelligence" targets.

For obvious reasons, the identity of these new targets has not been
revealed. It is almost certain, however, that many of them are located among
the growing volume of civilian (non-governmental) traffic. Traffic carried
on the communications satellites that serve Latin America is more likely to
be the target of this expansion than Canadian traffic is, but any step
towards the more systematic monitoring of civilian communications should be
of concern. Who will be targeted next?

Steps Toward Oversight
Unlike the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which has the Security
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), CSE has not for most of its existence
had any form of independent oversight organization to ensure that its
invasive powers are not abused. The establishment of an independent
oversight committee was recommended both by the Special Committee on the
Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security
Offences Act and by the SIRC itself.[19] The response of the Mulroney
government was that "a broad accountability system for CSE is in place."[20]
This "system," however, was no more than CSE's normal relationship with the
officials at ICSI and DND who have responsibility for the SIGINT program. As
the record of the RCMP Security Service, and later CSIS, demonstrated,
intelligence agencies should not be relied upon to police themselves.[21]

The Chretien government initially also maintained that CSE did not require
independent oversight. To its credit, however, on 21 March 1995 it permitted
the passage of a motion by MP Derek Lee calling on the government to
"establish an independent external mechanism to review the operations of the
Communications Security Establishment, CSE, similar to the role played by
the Security Intelligence Review Committee for the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, and table a report annually in the House."[22] The
following day, Defence Minister David Collenette announced that the
government would indeed establish such a mechanism.[23]

Fifteen months later, on 19 June 1996, Collenette announced in the House of
Commons that the government "has appointed Mr. Claude Bisson, former chief
justice of Quebec, under part II of the Inquiries Act, as the first
commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment. He will have
full access to all materials, records and documentation. He will make an
annual report to me as minister which I in turn will make to
Parliament."[24] Mr. Bisson was appointed to a second three-year term on 15
June 1999.

The CSE Commissioner can be reached at:

Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
P.O. Box 1984,
Station 'B',
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1P 5R5

The Commissioner's first annual report was released in April 1997. This
report and subsequent reports can be found on the Commissioner's website.
Each contains a variant of the following assurance: "I am of the opinion
that CSE has acted lawfully in the performance of its mandated activities
during the period under review. I am also satisfied that CSE has not
targeted Canadian citizens or permanent residents."[25]

The creation of the Office of the CSE Commissioner is a strong step towards
reassuring Canadians that their privacy is not being violated by CSE. In my
view, however, a permanent oversight mechanism should have:

a.. a permanent, statutory existence with provision for an independent,
non-partisan, and adequately-funded staff (possibly as part of the SIRC);
b.. statutory oversight powers affording full access to the personnel and
files of CSE, CFIOG, related agencies, and their activities;
c.. the power to examine all SIGINT acquired by the Canadian government,
whether collected by CSE, CFIOG, other Canadian organizations, corporations,
or individuals, or foreign governments, corporations, or individuals;
d.. the power to examine, and make recommendations on the reform of, the
legal and policy regime pertaining to SIGINT activities (i.e., not just to
examine compliance with the existing legal regime) in order to provide the
greatest protection possible for the privacy of Canadians while not unduly
limiting Canada's ability to collect essential intelligence; and
e.. the power to report to the Prime Minister and Cabinet whenever it
deems necessary, and to make an annual public report.
A number of other reforms also would be useful, including:

a.. the establishment of an explicit, statutory mandate for CSE (and for
Canadian SIGINT activities in general), providing a legal definition of
foreign intelligence and prohibiting the collection of non-foreign
intelligence, except as mandated under the CSIS Act;
b.. clarification and reform of the laws pertaining to the interception of
communications (including the establishment of a requirement for judicial
warrants for the interception of any communication known to begin and/or end
in Canada); and
c.. a legal prohibition on the receipt of any information that it would
have been illegal for the Canadian government itself to collect.
Endnotes
[1] Kevin O'Neill, ed., History of CBNRC, 1987, Chapter 2, Annex G (IAC
SIGINT Memorandum No. 1, CONTROL OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) IN CANADA,
24 August 1977), released in severed form under the Access to Information
Act.

[2] For more information on Canada's wartime SIGINT activities, see John
Bryden, Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World
War, Lester Publishing, 1993.

[3] History of CBNRC, Chapter 17, p. 2.

[4] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Sub-Committee on National Security, 15 June 1993, p. 11:9; Statement by
Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Clerk, Security and Intelligence, to Standing
Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, 2 May 1995.

[5] CANADIAN FORCES SUPPLEMENTARY RADIO SYSTEM, Department of National
Defence, 21 January 1997.

[6] On Course: National Security for the 1990s, Solicitor General, 1991, p.
54.

[7] On Course, p. 54.

[8] Report on Plans and Priorities 1998-99, Department of National Defence,
1998.

[9] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.

[10] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 24 April 1990, p. 27:9.

[11] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.

[12] Blair Seaborn, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 20 February 1990, p. 16:9.

[13] Quoted in Peter Moon, ``Spy agency left minister in dark,'' Globe and
Mail, 3 June 1991, p. A4. Elsewhere Blais has commented that ``While I had
responsibility for the estimates presented to Parliament, that
responsibility did not extend to the exercise of ministerial control over
the CSE. In practice the control was bureaucratic, in my view
short-circuiting the principle of political accountability on which our
democracy is founded.'' (Jean Jacques Blais, ``Committee should be expanded
to review other agencies,'' Ottawa Citizen, 2 July 1992, p. A11.)

[14] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G

[15] See, e.g., Minister of State (External Relations) Jean-Luc Pepin,
testimony, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 22 September 1983, p. 19.

[16] Robert Kaplan, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 5 April 1984, p. 11:68.

[17] Letter from Commander F.B. Frewer, Director Public Affairs Operations,
National Defence, to Peter Moon, 15 April 1991.

[18] Personal Information Index 1988, 1988, p. 47- 3.

[19] In Flux But Not in Crisis, report of the Special Committee on the
Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security
Offences Act, September 1990, pp. 152-3; Annual Report 1988-89, Security
Intelligence Review Committee, 1989.

[20] On Course, p. 55.

[21] There is little reason to expect that CSE has been any more reliable in
this respect. See, for example, the allegations in the book Spyworld (Mike
Frost and Michel Gratton, Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American
Intelligence Establishments, Doubleday Canada, 1994) concerning the
interception of Quebec government communications. In 1991, ``former CSE
employees and other sources,'' told the Globe and Mail that ``in the past
the agency routinely broke Canadian laws in the collection of intelligence
involving Canadians.'' (Peter Moon, ``Secrecy shrouds spy agency,'' Globe
and Mail, 27 May 1991, pp. A1, A4.) This allegation has not been proven, but
a disquieting example of CSE failing to follow appropriate procedures and
respect the rights of one of its own employees is on the public record in
Muriel Korngold Wexler, Record of Decision (file 166-13-17850), Public
Service Staff Relations Board, 12 March 1990. This document includes a
detailed description of the mistreatment and eventual unjust firing of CSE
cryptanalyst Edwina Slattery during the 1980s. It should be noted that Ms.
Slattery considers the Record of Decision's description of the events
surrounding her firing to be inaccurate in many respects, notwithstanding
the fact that it supported her claim that she had been unjustly fired and
recommended that she receive compensation equivalent to two years' pay. Ms.
Slattery eventually took the case to the Federal Court of Canada and
continues to pursue it in other ways.

[22] House of Commons Debates, 21 March 1995, pp. 10815-10820.

[23] Tu Thanh Ha, ``Secretive agency to be more open, Collenette says,''
Globe and Mail, 23 March 1995, p. A5.

[24] House of Commons Debates, 19 June 1996.

[25] Annual Report of the Communications Establishment Commissioner
1996-1997, Office of the Communications Establishment Commissioner, 1997, p.
10.

VAls minority report!
Heritage Front Affair Val's Minority Reports
THE HERITAGE FRONT AFFAIR: OUR VIEW DISSENTING OPINION of the REFORM
PARTY of CANADA
Presented by Val Meredith, M.P.
THE TRUTH IS OUT THERE
It was nineteen months ago when the Sub-Committee on National Security
began its consideration of the Security Intelligence Review
Committee's Heritage Front Affair report. Finally, after a long and
often arduous effort, the Sub-Committee has tabled its report.
At this point in time, it is important to clarify a couple of
significant issues: The delays in producing the Sub-Committee report
have nothing to do with the activities of the opposition parties, but
rather are due solely to delays caused by membership changes and
disagreements among the government members.
Secondly, the so-called report of this Sub-Committee has little input
from the opposition members. The joint dissenting opinion of the Bloc
Quebecois and the Reform Party more accurately reflects the
multi-party consensus of the majority of members of this Sub-Committee
who actually participated in most of the Sub-Committee's hearings.
While the joint dissenting opinion does not fully reflect the Reform
Party's position on this issue, it is included to illustrate the
changes to the report imposed by the government members.
It must be noted that the major changes to this report did not occur
during a Sub-Committee meeting, and neither opposition member was
present. It is clear that the Liberal government was not prepared for
the Sub-Committee to table the more critical report that is now the
joint dissenting opinion. With regard to the official report of the
Sub-Committee, the current government members of the Sub-Committee
have produced an extremely emasculated version of the original report.
Their report is just an extension of SIRC's Heritage Front Affair
report which did not provide a sufficiently critical review of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service's investigation.
THE SIRC REPORT SIRC claims to be the "eyes and ears of the public and
Parliament on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service." Yet after
months of consideration of the Heritage Front Affair report, it is
clear that SIRC has been not only negligent in this role, but
deliberately dishonest as well. Instead of providing Parliament with a
thorough and objective review of CSIS' use of a human source in its
investigation of the Heritage Front, SIRC's report exonerates CSIS and
the Source of any wrongdoing.
In its exoneration of CSIS, SIRC ignored or suppressed any evidence
that was inconsistent with their conclusion that the Service did no
wrong. SIRC has wilfully mislead Parliament and the Canadian people.
The exoneration of CSIS by SIRC is a betrayal of SIRC's role as a
review committee. While the Reform Party is deeply concerned with the
wrongdoings of CSIS, SIRC's refusal to address these transgressions in
an open and honest manner is cause for even greater concern.
After nineteen months of reviewing the SIRC report and obtaining
additional information, it is clear that SIRC is not fulfilling the
function that Parliament intended. Originally the Reform Party had
planned to do a thorough and critical review of the SIRC report,
pointing out numerous inaccuracies and omissions. However, because the
original version would have been too lengthy, we have chosen to focus
on two main issues: Grant Bristow - CSIS Source, and the CSIS
investigation concerning Preston Manning, that formed Chapter VIII of
the Heritage Front Affair. ; GRANT BRISTOW - CSIS HUMAN SOURCE Unlike
the government members of the Sub- Committee, I have no hesitancy in
identifying Grant Bristow as the CSIS Source who infiltrated the
Heritage Front.
This position is not an assumption, nor speculation. In August 1994, I
was contacted by an individual who had first-hand knowledge of Grant
Bristow as a CSIS Source. A former police source, this individual was
approached by Bristow, who offered to introduce him to a CSIS
investigator.
In September 1994 I accompanied this individual to a SIRC interview.
The information this individual provided is faithfully recorded in the
SIRC report at section 3.1.3, although it does not identify Bristow as
the Source.
In addition, at his appearance before the Sub- Committee on May 27,
1996, the Director of CSIS, Mr. Ward Elcock, inadvertently confirmed
that Bristow was indeed the CSIS Source. In his opening statement,
which was also provided in writing, the Director made the following
comment: "What about our source's arrest in Toronto, along with
American white supremacist Sean Maguire? That was a co-ordinated
operation with law enforcement agencies. Mr. Maguire was expelled from
Canada. Our source was released. No criminal offence was committed."
Now contrast the Director's above comments with the relevant passage
in SIRC's Heritage Front Affair report: "On September 20, 1991, Sean
Maguire and Grant Bristow were travelling in the latter's car, when
they were stopped at gunpoint by the heavily armed Metro Toronto
Emergency Task Force. Sean Maguire was arrested on an Immigration
warrant. RCMP and Immigration officials were on hand for the arrest,
as was a CSIS investigator from Toronto Region.
Grant Bristow, when he was stopped, had guns in the trunk of his car.
Both men were taken to police station 41." (emphasis added) It is
obvious from the above-mentioned information that Bristow is the CSIS
Source in question. It is an issue, because the way that SIRC wrote
their report, many of the questionable activities were committed by
Bristow, as opposed to the Source. So it is important to acknowledge
that Bristow was indeed the Source.
As expressed in paragraph 28 of the joint dissenting opinion ("Having
concluded that the placement of a human source was acceptable,
although for a shorter time than this Source was actually in place,
the opposition members of the Sub-Committee then asked themselves
whether the Service should have recruited and put in place this
particular Source?"), there were serious questions about using Bristow
as the Source. While SIRC made all efforts to downplay Bristow's role
in the creation and operation of the Heritage Front, clearly he was
responsible for much of the success of the organization.
The best indication of Bristow's role in the Heritage Front was the
video that the Front put out with excerpts of Bristow's speeches, that
had been edited out of the previously released videos. The excerpts
from this video show that Bristow was the main administrator of the
Heritage Front. He was responsible for the raising of money, for
selling memberships, literature and paraphernalia, and for getting
people out to Heritage Front rallies and demonstrations. His
questionable contributions can be best summarized from the one video
where he bragged that the Heritage Front in Toronto raised more money
to assist incarcerated members of the white supremacist terrorist
organization, The Order, than any other group in North America. ;
Bristow under police investigation.
There is one other aspect of Bristow's history that SIRC chose to
ignore, despite the fact that this incident was in the original
newspaper story that spawned their investigation. In 1993, the Metro
Toronto Police Force investigated Heritage Front members Carl Fischer,
Elkar Fischer and Andrew Maynard, for the kidnapping and assault of
Tyrone Mason, another Heritage Front member. During the course of
their investigation the police began to actively investigate Grant
Bristow.
The police investigators were so convinced that Bristow was involved
in witness tampering, that they applied to the courts and obtained a
Criminal Code Part VI warrant to intercept his communications. When
the Mason case finally made its way to trial in the fall of 1995, a
plea bargain was arranged. As a result of plea bargaining all charges
were dropped against Maynard, and though convicted, the Fischer
brothers received only a thirty day sentence to be served
intermittently.
Interestingly, a lawyer representing the federal government was
involved in the negotiations. It would appear that Bristow's role in
the incident prevented the Crown from aggressively prosecuting the
case. Despite frequently referring to this case in their testimony as
an example of the heinous activities that Heritage Front members were
capable of committing,
SIRC completely ignored the police investigation of Bristow's role in
the case. ; Bristow and the Reform Party. The Reform Party is also
deeply concerned about Bristow's activities within the Reform Party.
As reported in the SIRC report, CSIS was aware that Heritage Front
leader Wolfgang Droege "wanted to discredit Preston Manning and the
Reform Party before the general election in 1993. This idea would be
accomplished by the Movement publicly identifying itself and its
security relationship with the Reform Party's senior executive level.
Among those who allegedly knew of the Droege plan were Gerry Lincoln,
James Dawson, Ernst Zundel, Terry Long, Jurgen Neumann, Peter
Mitrevski, and Grant Bristow (emphasis added)." Not only was Bristow
aware of this plan to discredit the Reform Party, but he was one of
the major players in it. Bristow, along with Alan Overfield, were the
two individuals who made all the security arrangements.
While it was Overfield who originally offered the services of his
bailiff company to the Reform Party, he was not aware of Droege's plan
to discredit the party. Thus it was left to Bristow, a CSIS source, to
create the relationship.
According to the representative for the Reform Party, Andrew Flint,
Grant Bristow did a very effective job in creating the security
relationship between the Reform Party and the Heritage Front. In an
affidavit sworn on May 1, 1995, Flint described the June 1991 meeting
with Bristow and Overfield in the following manner: "The meeting was
dominated by Grant Bristow who did most of the talking regarding the
security for the event. I was certainly very impressed by his
immaculate dress which included an elegant suit and highly polished
shoes. This was the only meeting I attended involving security for the
up-coming rally."
Flint also mentioned that "at the meeting of the security team for the
June 1991 event at the International Centre, Grant Bristow requested a
letter from me stating that he and Al Overfield were authorized to
handle the security for this event. I was told he needed it to present
to the Regional Police which operated a sub-station on the premises of
the International Centre."
This letter is also mentioned in the SIRC report. However, the report
stated "Overfield asked for the letter in order to receive recognition
and to show that he was appointed. Grant Bristow's name was included
in the letter because he said: #145;Unless we have a letter of
understanding, there could be legal liabilities if there was a
confrontation with protesters at a Reform Party event.'
" Naturally, Bristow is the source of this information. It is
interesting that Bristow claimed that Overfield asked for the letter
to receive recognition, and that his own name appeared only for
liability purposes. If Bristow's name was necessary for liability
purposes, then why were the names of the other individuals who were
providing security not included as well?
In reality, the most useful application of this letter would have been
to prove a security arrangement between the Heritage Front and the
Reform Party. Yet, according to the SIRC report, Overfield was unaware
of the plan to discredit the Reform Party, so there is little reason
for him to request the letter. Bristow on the other hand, would
certainly have pleased Droege by providing him with a letter to
demonstrate that the security arrangement between the Reform Party and
the Heritage Front actually existed. SIRC's willingness to accept
Bristow's version of events is typical of their report.
Much of the report is based on the evidence of Bristow. He is cited as
the source of information 135 times; 96 times as the Source and a
further 39 times as Grant Bristow. In addition, the source handler is
cited 20 times as the basis of information.
SIRC has basically provided the public with Grant Bristow's version of
events, while contradictory information was generally dismissed. While
SIRC denied any wrongdoing by Bristow or CSIS, they failed to address
a very important issue - the entire operation was conducted in
violation of a 1989 Ministerial Direction.
On October 30, 1989 then Solicitor General Pierre Blais issued the
following Ministerial Direction on #145;CSIS' Use of Human Sources' to
the Director of CSIS. The Direction states in part: "that special care
is required in regard to investigations which impact on, or which
appear to impact on, the most sensitive institutions of our society. I
am primarily thinking in this regard of institutions in the academic,
political, religious, media or trade union fields.... I am writing
that you personally, or a Deputy Director designated by you in
writing, approve the use by the Service of confidential sources in
such investigation."
It is obvious that Bristow's role as one of two individuals who was
"jointly responsible for the security of all present and future Reform
Party Events that are planned for this region," would be part of a
human source operation that "impacted, or appeared to impact on a
political institution."
According to the Ministerial Direction, this would have required that
either the Director or the Deputy Director (Operations) approve
Bristow's role as part of the security team. In reality, Toronto
Region only sought out CSIS Headquarters' advice in August, two months
after the Mississauga rally, and even then the file did not go to the
Director or the Deputy Director.
SIRC goes on to great lengths to point out that CSIS was careful that
only Droege's activities as they related to the Reform Party were
investigated, not the Reform Party itself. But they do not address the
issue of a CSIS source operation that impacted on, or at least
appeared to impact upon a sensitive political institution, namely the
Reform Party. SIRC's refusal to address this issue is somewhat
mystifying, considering that was one of the questions that the Reform
Party specifically wanted answered when we put forth a series of
questions to SIRC in a letter, presented to them at the September 13,
1994 Sub-Committee meeting:
Question 73: Given the 1989 Ministerial Directive by then Solicitor
General Pierre Blais, concerning CSIS utilizing sources in sensitive
institutions such as political parties, religious groups and the
media, was the Director's approval required prior to Bristow's
attendance at the Reform Party meeting?;
Question 74: If yes, did the Director approve of this operation?
Bristow's role in the security group was indeed crucial in forming the
link between the Heritage Front and the Reform Party. As Andrew Flint
stated, he was impressed with Bristow's "knowledge of security
procedures and technical terminology...", as well as his "elegant suit
and highly polished shoes." Grant Bristow was the one member of the
Heritage Front who had the respectability and the expertise to make
Flint believe that he was dealing with a legitimate group of
individuals. It is extremely unlikely that Flint would have ever used
this group if he had met with skinheads or other Heritage Front
members.
In the final analysis, Wolfgang Droege had a plot to discredit the
Reform Party by linking the party to the Heritage Front through its
security arrangement.
Grant Bristow played a pivotal role in this conspiracy, if in no other
way than by providing the security group with the respectability and
expertise they could not have gotten elsewhere within the Heritage
Front.
When the story broke in 1992 the Reform Party was indeed discredited,
although there are no objective means to measure to what extent. It is
bad enough that Droege, an individual deemed to be a threat to the
security of Canada, devised a plot to discredit a legitimate political
party and CSIS did nothing about it. It is much worse when Grant
Bristow, a CSIS source, played an integral role in accomplishing this
task, in violation of a Ministerial Direction. But it is a complete
travesty when SIRC, the body that Parliament established to monitor
CSIS, fails to even address the issue. CSIS INVESTIGATION OF PRESTON
MANNING While compiling its report on the Heritage Front Affair, SIRC
included a chapter that had nothing to do with the Heritage Front. It
was about the Reform Party and a foreign government, subsequently
identified as South Africa. SIRC wanted us to believe that by
including this chapter they could allay any fears amongst Reformers
that CSIS had investigated the party, or the leadership.
In the SIRC report, the CSIS investigation is portrayed as a
by-the-book, straight-forward operation. Upon closer inspection this
investigation proved to be anything but straight- forward. Rather than
allaying any of our concerns about CSIS investigations, SIRC's
willingness to lie about the facts has made the Reform Party even more
suspicious.
Through a Privacy Act request by Preston Manning, CSIS released its
documents on this investigation. Although they are heavily censored,
the documents show that SIRC withheld information and misrepresented
the facts in their report, so that they could demonstrate that CSIS
conducted a proper investigation. Any evidence that was contradictory
to their conclusion was suppressed.
In the following pages, we will review the actual investigation,
SIRC's version of the investigation, and the bizarre fallout from this
chapter of their report. In exchanges of correspondence and testimony
that occurred after the tabling of the report, we learned that CSIS
documents were altered and misdated.
We observed SIRC make admissions, and then subsequently retract these
admissions, completely contradicting their earlier statements and
testimony. The Director of CSIS also provided a version of events that
not only contradicted his earlier testimony, but also required him to
admit that almost everyone who touched this file made mistakes.
In the final analysis, the Reform Party is convinced that CSIS
launched an insupportable investigation of Preston Manning in 1989,
and tried to cover it up five months later. Both the current
management at CSIS and SIRC have continued that cover-up, frequently
changing their story when confronted with facts that did not fit their
version of the events. ;
A dubious source sparks an investigation. As SIRC reported, and the
CSIS documents confirm, this investigation began with a tip from a
source who was described by the CSIS investigator as "self-serving and
very opportunistic, particularly if it benefited himself." This
dubious source informed CSIS about a conversation that he had with a
board member of an association that promoted links between South
Africa and Canada. This source then stated that the board member said
that his group was giving money to Preston Manning's campaign, as
Manning was running against External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.
This information by itself should not have been of interest to CSIS.
In democracies, citizens can financially support whoever they want in
an election, for whatever reason. For CSIS to investigate they needed
information that South Africa was actually providing the money. During
the first meeting between CSIS and this dubious source, the source
stated that he thought the board member meant that the money was
coming from South Africa. When the source realized that he did not
have the key piece of evidence that CSIS required, he miraculously
obtained it less than three weeks later. The source stated that he had
been talking to an unidentified, close associate of the board member,
who supposedly told him that the South Africans may have contributed
as much as $45,000 to Preston Manning and the Reform Party in trying
to defeat Joe Clark in his riding of Yellowhead. This is the extent of
CSIS' information about the Manning campaign receiving money from a
foreign government.
Third-hand information from a source who is not only of unknown
reliability, but who had been identified by the CSIS investigator as
"self-serving and opportunistic", should not be the basis of a CSIS
investigation of any Canadian citizen, much less the leader of a
legitimate political party. ; CSIS analyst stated, basis for
investigation "difficult to support"! We are not the only ones to
question the validity of this investigation.
After the regional investigator sent two reports to CSIS Headquarters
in November 1988, a response from the HQ analyst on the South Africa
desk was sent to the region in January 1989. As the SIRC report
acknowledged, the analyst stated that in HQ's opinion, the source of
the alleged funding was most likely the group of Canadian businessmen
who belonged to the association. But when the analyst addressed the
possibility of foreign funding, SIRC did not accurately portray the
analyst's comments. The analyst did state that, "if it were shown that
South Africa indeed contributed as much as $45,000 to Manning's
campaign, HQ could in time attempt to make the argument that South
Africa is unduly influencing Canadian politics." However, SIRC chose
not to include the following sentence by the analyst in their report:
"To say the least, this kind of argument would be difficult to
support."
Since the analyst had stated that there was no basis for a CSIS
investigation, contradicting SIRC's conclusion that it was a
legitimate investigation, SIRC chose to suppress this line. It is the
only line in that section of the report that SIRC did not include in
the Heritage Front Affair report. The HQ analyst concluded this
January 10, 1989 message by requesting that the region keep "HQ
apprised of any forthcoming information which you may obtain in light
of the above."
There was no further information forwarded by the region. Rather, the
next document that appears in Manning's file is an authorization of a
TARC Level 1 investigation, dated October 17, 1989. ; Lead up to the
TARC Level 1 investigation - January 10, 1989 to October 17, 1989.
While there is a great deal of controversy over what happened between
October 17, 1989 and March 30, 1990, we are equally perplexed about
what happened between January 10, 1989 and October 17, 1989.
The Reform Party has never received a logical answer to why an analyst
on the South African desk in CSIS HQ stated that there was no basis
for an investigation into the alleged contribution to Preston Manning
on January 10, 1989, and yet without any additional, or new,
information, an analyst on the South African desk in CSIS HQ submitted
a request for a TARC Level 1 investigation on October 17, 1989? SIRC
attempted to provide the following as an answer: A reliable source
provided CSIS with information that a foreign country (read South
Africa) had transferred over a quarter of a million dollars to Canada,
to try to influence 24 Members of Parliament from other political
parties (read Progressive Conservatives and Liberals).
When asked, SIRC stated that CSIS did not take any steps to
investigate these M.P.s. If the information about South Africa funding
these 24 M.P.s did indeed inspire the investigation, why was there no
mention of this on the form (REQUEST FOR AND APPROVAL OF COLLECTION
LEVELS 1, 2 AND CATEGORY A aka 4002) authorizing the investigation?
It is therefore unlikely that this information played any role in the
investigation. SIRC would still have us believe that CSIS received
information from a reliable source that the South African Government
was using over a quarter of million dollars to influence 24
Conservative and Liberal M.P.s, but did not investigate them. Instead,
CSIS proceeded to launch an investigation of Preston Manning, who was
neither an M.P., nor a Progressive Conservative nor a Liberal.
We find SIRC's logic to be less than satisfying. ; The Actual
Investigation: Who, What, When, Why? >From the moment the Solicitor
General tabled the Heritage Front Affair report, one particular
passage has caused a great deal of grief for the Sub-Committee, SIRC
and CSIS. This passage resulted in a number of admissions,
explanations, contradictions, retractions and accusations.
The Reform Party believes that the best way to present this complex
subject is in the following chronological manner:
December 15, 1994 The Solicitor General tabled SIRC's report, the
Heritage Front Affair, in the House of Commons. Included in section
VIII, at paragraph 8.3 is the following passage: "On October 17, 1989,
the Service decided to formally investigate the alleged $45,000
contribution. CSIS said that they could not go back to the informant
as all contacts had ended on December 31, 1988.
The Service authorized a three-month Level 1 investigation entitled:
#145;LNU FNU (Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral
Campaign)'. The Service cited section 12 and paragraph 2 (b) of the
CSIS Act as the legal basis for the investigation." ;
December 16, 1994 ;SIRC appeared before the Sub-Committee on National
Security. Having been advised that the above-mentioned passage was
inaccurate, the Reform Party made the following request:
Ms. Meredith: "Can you have your officials go back to CSIS and have
them examine the hard copy of the original authorization of the Level
one investigation on the Reform Party and a foreign government, not
just the corrected copies? Specifically, can your employees examine
the caption on the file?"
Summary - After the meeting, the Reform Party was approached by SIRC
research officials. They asked what they should be looking for
specifically. This led the Reform Party to believe that SIRC was not
aware of a changed caption. ;
January 27, 1995 In a letter from Maurice Archdeacon, the Executive
Director of SIRC, to Derek Lee, M.P., the Chairman of the
Sub-Committee on National Security, Val Meredith's request was
answered in the following manner:
"Ms. Meredith, M.P. requested that SIRC have its officials re-examine
the original authorization of the Level I investigation on the Reform
Party and a foreign government. Specifically, Ms. Meredith asked to be
told what the caption was on the file.
The nature of Ms. Meredith's question suggests that the answer may
well already be known to her. Nevertheless, the caption she referred
to for the targeting authority dated October 17, 1989 was #145;Preston
Manning.' The caption was revised on March 30, 1990 to state,
#145;LNU/FNU (Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral
Campaign).'
I would be remiss if I did not point out that, aside from the amended
caption, there were no other changes to the text of the targeting
requests/authorizations. That is, the text in each of the documents
was identical, and clearly stated that the investigation was to
determine whether a #145;foreign influence' threat existed. CSIS did
not suspect Mr. Manning of complicity..."
Summary - Mr. Archdeacon admitted that the name on the targeting
authority dated October 17, 1989 was #145;Preston Manning.' He also
mentioned that "there were no other changes to the text of the
targeting request/authorizations. That is, the text in each of the
documents was identical." It is quite apparent that Mr. Archdeacon is
stating that there were two versions of the same document, with the
only change being to the caption. From his choice of words being the
#145;targeting request/authorizations', there is no doubt that Mr.
Archdeacon is referring to the form 4002. ;
March 30, 1995 The Solicitor General appears before the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, for the Main Estimates. He is
accompanied by his Deputy Minister and the heads of the various
agencies under his control, including Mr. Ward Elcock, Director of
CSIS. The Reform Party asked Mr. Elcock a number of questions about
this particular investigation.
The following excerpts are from the transcript of this meeting: (Page 15)
Ms. Meredith: "Can you explain then why Mr. Manning's name was used
for a TARC level one investigation and why that investigation was not
conducted under the foreign government?"
Mr. Elcock: "I don't know why that name was used. I suspect that, as
much as anything else, it may have been just used as a convenient tag.
I don't know the precise reason why it was used, but there is no
question from the file that at any time the subject of the
investigation was ever Mr. Manning himself."
Ms. Meredith: "Why was that file named under Mr. Manning, then, and
not under #145;unknown contributor?'"
Mr. Elcock: "I said, Mr. Chairman, that I didn't know the reason why
that name was used. It clearly was in error, because in substance, the
investigation at all times was an investigation of the actions of a
foreign government, not an investigation of Mr. Manning."
(Page 17) Ms. Meredith: "So Mr. Manning's name never came up under a
requisition or a request for a TARC Level One investigation?"
Mr. Elcock: "It was in the sense, Mr. Chairman, that the title of the
TARC was initially in Mr. Manning's name. His name was there. Was
there an investigation of Mr. Manning? Absolutely not."
Ms. Meredith: "I didn't ask if there was an investigation of Mr.
Manning. I asked if a TARC Level was ever instituted under Mr.
Manning's name?"
Mr. Elcock: "The answer, Mr. Chairman, was that there was a TARC Level
in Mr. Manning's name. But as I have said, the subject of that TARC
was not Mr. Manning at any time, ever."
(Page 34) Ms. Meredith: "I have your policy manual here, the
declassified version of the CSIS Operational Manual. For a TARC Level
one authority, an investigator must submit a request for an approval
form, CSIS form 4002. There's a space for the name of the individual
to be investigated. Can you tell me whose name was in that spot on the
form 4002 in question, signed on October 17, 1989?"
Mr. Elcock: "As I think I said earlier, there was in the TARC title
Mr. Manning's name. However, as I said quite clearly, the subject of
that file was at all times an investigation of contributions in terms
of the possibility of contributions having been made by a foreign
government to a Canadian political party. It was at no time an
investigation of Mr. Manning himself, notwithstanding the title. I
would that (sic) the title had been otherwise, but it wasn't. That's
the fact."
Summary - During this meeting, the Director of CSIS made it quite
clear that on October 17, 1989 the TARC Level 1 authorization, the
form 4002, was on Preston Manning. Mr. Elcock did not once suggest
that the caption was "Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's
Electoral Campaign." (Nor did Mr. Elcock suggest that the error
occurred with a different document known as a FILE OPENING REQUEST -
PEOPLE FILES form.) At this same meeting the Reform Party also
questioned the Director as to why SIRC was not made aware that the
original 4002 was in the name of #145;Preston Manning'.
That led to the following exchange: (Page 17)
Ms. Meredith: "Can you explain to me why that information wasn't
provided to SIRC? In their report, they reported very thoroughly on
that investigation, with the exception of the original TARC level?"
Mr. Elcock: "Why what information?"
Ms. Meredith: "That the TARC level on Mr. Manning was excluded from
the SIRC report, that SIRC was unaware of that having happened?"
Mr. Elcock: "I don't know that in fact SIRC was unaware. I don't know
why they would not have put it in their report or would have chosen
not to do that. That's SIRC's business, and you would have to address
that question to SIRC."
Ms. Meredith: "When we brought it to SIRC's attention, they were
unaware of that fact. It was only by it being brought to their
attention that they were able to go back and find out the information.
So I assumed from that they did not know that information was not
provided to them, and I would like to know why it wasn't?"
Mr. Elcock: "I don't know that that assumption is correct; I would
have to check. In fact, my belief is that they did have that
information, but I'll certainly check that for the hon. member."
Summary - This was the first information that the Reform Party
received that SIRC was aware that the original TARC Level was on
Preston Manning. ;
March 31, 1995 In response to Mr. Elcock's testimony, Val Meredith
wrote to SIRC, seeking clarification of what SIRC knew and when. "Was
any member or employee of SIRC aware that the original TARC
investigation launched on October 17, 1989 (was) in the name of
Preston Manning and not "LNU FNU (Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston
Manning's Electoral Campaign), when the Heritage Front Affair report
was tabled on December 9, 1994?" Summary - The Reform Party
specifically asked SIRC if they knew prior to the tabling of their
report that the TARC investigation was in the name of #145;Preston
Manning.' ;
April 7, 1995 In a letter, under the name of Jacques Courtois, P.C.,
Q.C., but signed by Maurice Archdeacon, Val Meredith's letter was
responded to in the following fashion: "You asked whether any member
or employee of SIRC was aware of the TARC investigation launched on
October 17, 1989 in the name of Preston Manning and not the corrected
title. SIRC staff saw the original title of the targeting
authorization, as well as the corrected title and all other documents
pertaining to the investigation. As I mentioned in my letter dated
January 27, 1995 to Mr. Derek Lee, M.P. Chairperson of the
Sub-Committee on National Security, the description (narrative text)
of the authorization never changed... The original caption was seen
for what it was - an error, and the Service corrected that error five
years ago."
Summary - Once again SIRC admitted that the caption on the TARC on
October 17, 1989 was in the name of Preston Manning. They also
admitted that they knew this prior to tabling their report. Although
Mr. Archdeacon does not specifically state why SIRC chose to exclude
this information from their report, the only possible explanation they
offer for its exclusion is that the original caption was seen as an
error, and that CSIS corrected that error in 1990. ;
June 20, 1995 SIRC appeared before the National Security Sub-Committee
for the Main Estimates. The Reform Party asked SIRC a number of
questions about this particular investigation.
The following excerpts are from the transcript of this meeting: (Page 7)
Ms. Meredith: "Are you trying to tell this committee that there was
not a TARC Level one investigation opened on Preston Manning?"
Mr. Archdeacon: "No, I'm not, obviously, because we're repeating
discussions we had over several hours earlier. You know very well that
I'm not doing so. Someone - and we admitted it was sloppy work, and
I'm sure the Director of CSIS would admit that - instead of taking the
trouble to write on the TARC title #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston
Manning's campaign' just wrote #145;Preston Manning.' The text,
however, in the TARC report makes it absolutely clear - and you read
the text - that Mr. Manning was not being investigated. We can't say
it any more than this. It's question asked and answered."
(Page 20)
Mr. Archdeacon: "The fact is at the moment you're looking at the form
- I understand your point - and saying the form of that 4002 gave the
impression, because the name Preston Manning was there, that the TARC
was on Preston Manning. That is the form of it."
Summary - SIRC once again confirmed that the 4002 was in the name of
Preston Manning. Mr. Archdeacon went so far as to state that he
obviously wasn't denying that there was a TARC Level one investigation
opened on Preston Manning. ;
June 21, 1995 to November 7, 1995 During this time period, the
Sub-Committee on National Security considered its report on the
Heritage Front Affair. During these meetings, the Sub-Committee was
operating on the understanding that the original 4002 was in the name
of "Preston Manning" and this was altered to "LNU/FNU (Unknown
Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign" on March 30,
1990. ; November 9, 1995 To clarify questions about alterations to
4002, and who knew about the caption "Preston Manning", the
Sub-Committee sent a letter to the Director of CSIS. The following are
the key excerpts from this letter: "On January 27, 1995, SIRC advised
the Subcommittee, in response to its questions, that the caption on
the October 17, 1989 targeting authority dealt with in Chapter VIII of
the SIRC Report was originally #145;Preston Manning.' The Review
Committee went on in the same letter to advise us that the caption was
changed on March 30, 1990 to read #145;LNU-FNU (Unknown Contributor(s)
to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign).' How was the caption change
made on the Form 4002 - was the original form altered or was the
original form destroyed and a new, back-dated, re-signed or
re-initialled form created? Another of the documents contained in the
file obtained by Mr. Manning is a November 10, 1989 Transit Slip (Form
3040) from the Chief of Counter Intelligence - General Desk to the
Director General of Counter Intelligence. I would like to draw your
attention to item 5 on this document where it is asserted #145;caption
is considered appropriate under policy provision.' Can you provide the
Subcommittee with an explanation of this assertion in light of the
fact that at the time the caption read #145;Preston Manning' and was
not changed until March 30, 1990? If the caption was appropriate as it
was on November 10, 1989, what made it unacceptable on March 30,
1990?" Summary - These questions challenged SIRC's and CSIS'
contention that #145;Preston Manning's' name appearing in caption was
just a #145;clerical error.' It would be difficult for CSIS to
maintain the #145;clerical error' excuse if the Director General of
Counterintelligence was aware of the caption, and agreed with it. ;
March 29, 1996 According to CSIS, they did not receive the November 9,
1995 letter from the Sub-Committee until this date. There is no
explanation as to what happened to the letter during the intervening 4
1/2 months. ;
April 15, 1996 The Director of CSIS responded to the Sub-Committee's
letter of November 9, 1995. In a complete departure from previous
statements and testimony from CSIS and SIRC, the Director contended
that the Form 4002 never read #145;Preston Manning', but the original
caption was #145;Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral
Campaign.' Key excerpts from his letter are as follows: "In response
to your query regarding the #145;REQUEST FOR AND APPROVAL OF
COLLECTION LEVELS 1, 2 AND CATEGORY A' form, dated October 17, 1989, I
am satisfied that this is the original document associated with this
file. As is shown on this form, the original caption was #145;Unknown
Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign'. The
collection authority and a second form, #145;FILE OPENING REQUEST -
PEOPLE FILES', is required by the Service's Information Management
branch, in order to create a file. It was at this stage in the process
that the clerical error occurred regarding this file caption. In an
effort to facilitate the electronic opening and future retrieval of
this file and the relevant documents, the caption that was erroneously
entered on the #145;FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES' form was
#145;Preston Manning'. This error caused the creation of an automated
hard copy file under this incorrect caption. It was during the latter
part of March, 1990, while preparing this assessment report, that the
file caption error was corrected. Item 5 on the #145;TRANSIT SLIP'
(Form 3040), dated November 10, 1989, discusses the appropriateness of
the caption as presented originally - #145;Unknown Contributor(s) to
Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign' and the comments indicate that
the author believed the caption to be appropriate."
Summary - This was an astounding development. The Director totally
contradicted 15 months of statements and testimony from both SIRC and
himself. According to the January 27, 1995 letter from Maurice
Archdeacon to Derek Lee, M.P., the targeting authority (form 4002)
read #145;Preston Manning' on October 17, 1989 and was changed on
March 30, 1990. Mr. Elcock made no reference to this fact in his
letter. Nor does the Director address his own testimony before the
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs on March 30, 1995,
where the following exchange took place:
Ms. Meredith: "So Mr. Manning's name never came up under a requisition
or a request for a TARC Level One investigation?"
Mr. Elcock: "It was in the sense, Mr. Chairman, that the title of TARC
was initially in Mr. Manning's name. His name was there. Was there an
investigation of Mr. Manning? Absolutely not."
Ms. Meredith: "I didn't ask if there was an investigation of Mr.
Manning. I asked if a TARC Level was instituted under Mr. Manning's
name?"
Mr. Elcock: "The answer Mr. Chairman, was that there was a TARC Level
in Mr. Manning's name."
There is no explanation of why Mr. Elcock would state on March 30,
1995 that "the title of the TARC was initially in Mr. Manning's name,"
and then on April 15, 1996 he would write that "the original caption
was #145;Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral
Campaign.'"
It must also be noted that in none of the correspondence or testimony
from CSIS or SIRC, between December 16, 1994 and April 14, 1996, was
there even a single mention of a "FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES"
form. This particular form was certainly known to CSIS, as it was
included in Preston Manning's Privacy Act request. However, subsequent
investigation and testimony would show that Mr. Elcock was not
completely forthcoming in this letter. ;
May 15, 1996 SIRC appeared before the Sub-Committee on National
Security for the Main Estimates. While there was little discussion
about this issue at this meeting, the following exchanges occurred:
(page 30)
Mr. Discepola: "I'd like to know, then, in your opinion why in the
world Preston Manning's name was used at all in any of the
documentation that related to the investigation of the suspected third
country contribution to the election campaign."
Mr. Archdeacon: "I've forgotten the exact date but the original title
was #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston Manning's Election Campaign.'
It should of had more on it then that, but that was the exact title.
It was not titled #145;Preston Manning', and Mrs. Meredith has a copy
of the sheets of paper. Here it is, and the title on it is
#145;Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign.'
Then there's the text of what is to be looked at, which is whether
somebody, some country, was going to contribute money to Preston
Manning's electoral campaign. When you have a TARC like that you must
open a file, and this TARC was sent down to the management information
section in CSIS. Because it didn't have LNU/FNU in front of the
#145;Unknown Contributor(s)', which means last name unknown, first
name unknown, the only name the clerk down there could see was Preston
Manning, and you have to have a name on a file. So he didn't write
#145;Unknown Contributor(s)' , he wrote #145;Preston Manning'. That
was an error. He shouldn't have done that. That error remained like
that for at least three months without being corrected. It wasn't
corrected until about March, when the assessment was being done. There
have been allegations that the title on the TARC was changed. Written
in ink was #145;LNU/FNU' ahead of what had always been there and had
never been changed. Because Mrs. Meredith was so sure of this, and
because we knew she had our information from somewhere else, we
decided to have the original TARC X-rayed. We have exact evidence that
everything Mrs. Meredith has said about this - about it having been
titled #145;Preston Manning', about things having been typed around
it, and about all those sorts of things - is completely and totally
incorrect. The file was mistitled and the file does not give anybody
any reason to investigate anybody. A file title does not authorize
anybody to investigate anybody. There was never any time when every
CSIS agent across the country could have investigated Mr. Manning.
That is a figment of someone's imagination." (page 32)
Ms. Meredith: "Then I would like to put something on the record, Mr.
Chair. I'd like to put on the record, Mr. Archdeacon, that the
comments you just made are in complete contradiction to a letter on
January 27, 1995, addressed to Mr. Derek Lee, and in testimony you've
given before this committee. It's a complete contradiction."
The Chairman: "I'm sure SIRC would want to address that. Perhaps this
is something that can be clarified later. Can I take it, Mr.
Archdeacon, Mr. Courtois, that you would differ?"
Mr. Archdeacon: "We would differ with that characterization." ;
Summary - Mr. Archdeacon's comments are a complete departure from
SIRC's previous correspondence and testimony.
First of all, it was not Ms. Meredith who stated that the original
TARC was captioned #145;Preston Manning', it was Mr. Archdeacon
himself who first made this statement in his letter of January 27,
1995, when he stated:; "The caption she referred to for the targeting
authority dated October 17, 1989 was #145;Preston Manning'.
The caption was revised on March 30, 1990 to state, #145;LNU/FNU
(Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign).'"
Then there is the letter that Mr. Archdeacon signed on April 7, 1995,
in which he stated:; "You asked whether any member or employee of SIRC
was aware of the TARC investigation launched on October 17, 1989 in
the name of Preston Manning and not the corrected title. SIRC staff
saw the original title of the targeting authorization, as well as the
corrected title and all other documents pertaining to the
investigation."
Once again Mr. Archdeacon confirmed that the original title was
"Preston Manning", and admitted that SIRC staff saw both the original
title of the targeting authorization, as well as the corrected title.
If, as Mr. Archdeacon maintained on May 15, 1996, the original title
was "Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign",
why would he state in two pieces of correspondence that the caption
was "Preston Manning".
Furthermore, during SIRC's appearance before the National Security
Sub-Committee meeting on June 20, 1995, there was this exchange:;
Ms. Meredith: "Are you trying to tell this committee that there was
not a TARC Level one investigation opened on Preston Manning?"
Mr. Archdeacon: "No, I'm not obviously, because we're repeating
discussions we had over several hours earlier. You know very well that
I'm not doing so. Someone - and we admitted it was sloppy work, and
I'm sure the Director of CSIS would admit that - instead of taking the
trouble to write on the TARC title #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston
Manning's Campaign' just wrote #145;Preston Manning.'"
Mr. Archdeacon made no effort to explain why, on May 15, 1996, he told
the Sub-Committee that there was not a TARC Level one investigation
opened on Preston Manning, when on June 20, 1995 he stated the exact
opposite.
Clearly, Mr. Archdeacon and SIRC have fully endorsed the April 15,
1996 letter from the Director of CSIS. Like Mr. Elcock, they make no
effort to explain the contradictions.
There is one comment of Mr. Archdeacon that would be contradicted by
the CSIS Director two weeks later. Mr. Archdeacon made a definitive
statement that the error was caused by a clerk in the Management
Information Section, who wrote "Preston Manning." As we will see in
the next section, this statement has no basis in fact, but is rather a
figment of Mr. Archdeacon's imagination. ;
May 27, 1996 Mr. Elcock appeared before the Sub-Committee to answer
questions about the Heritage Front Affair. During his appearance the
Reform Party asked him about a number of discrepancies contained in
his letter of April 15, 1996.
Four of the specific subjects that were broached, included:
I) The Altered #145;FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES' Form. In his
letter, Mr. Elcock stated, "the caption that was erroneously entered
on the #145;FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES' form was #145;Preston
Manning.'" However, the copy of that form that Mr. Manning received in
his Privacy Act request did not read #145;Preston Manning', but rather
#145;Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign'.
It is obvious that the section of the form for the subject's name has
been altered, as have the sections for #145;Present Address' and
#145;Occupation'.
The following exchange took place in relation to this form:
Ms. Meredith: "Mr. Elcock, your letter clearly states that it was on
this file, this PEOPLE FILES form here, and if people look carefully
you can see where there has been alterations made to this document.
The alterations have been made not only on the subject line, but on
the #145;Occupation' line and the #145;Present Address' line. Your
letter states that it was this form that Preston Manning's name was
put on by mistake. I'm asking you why does this form not have Preston
Manning's name on it? It has #145;Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston
Manning's Electoral Campaign."
Mr. Elcock: "Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sundstrom reminds me that although it
doesn't show here underneath, it was just Preston Manning when the
form was first completed."
Ms. Meredith: "So, if you agree, or if you read Mr. Archdeacon's
comments where he noted it had been a clerk and it was a clerk in the
Management Information Section that changed the document from
#145;Unknown Contributor to Preston Manning' and put Preston Manning's
name in it. It's obvious that #145;Occupation' and #145;Present
Address' have also been altered, changed, whited-out. Did this clerk
also put Preston Manning's address and his occupation in there? Do
they have the right to just add that in as they saw fit?"
Mr. Elcock: "Mr. Chairman, it compounded the clerical error, but
there's nothing that prevents them from adding those details."
Summary - While Mr. Elcock confirmed that the #145;Subject Name',
#145;Occupation' and #145;Present Address' sections were all altered,
he maintained that it was a "clerical error". Well it might be
possible that a CSIS clerk would not use the proper caption in this
case, it is ludicrous to suggest that the clerk would, on his or her
own initiative, add Mr. Manning's address and occupation. Besides, if
as CSIS and SIRC maintain, Mr. Manning was never investigated, how did
CSIS even know his present address. In any event, as we shall see in
section #145;IV', the story of the clerk making a mistake is soon
retracted. ;
II) Citing a document two weeks before it existed. In the form 4002,
which authorized the TARC Level 1 investigation on October 17, 1989,
there is a reference to a proposed meeting between Mr. Manning and an
unidentified Ambassador. The reference goes on to state that the
meeting was canceled at the last minute by the Embassy. Only one
N.S.R. (CSIS database) message in the package obtained by Mr. Manning
in his Privacy Act request contained this information. It was dated
November 1, 1989, two weeks after the form 4002 was supposedly
completed.
Questions about this discrepancy went as follows:
Ms. Meredith: "Can I get you to go to tab #145;L' in the documents
that we've provided for you? This document is the only document that
was received under the access, under the Privacy Act, to Mr. Manning,
that makes any reference to an Ambassador and Preston Manning meeting,
and the meeting being canceled by the Embassy. Can you give me the
date of that message?"
Mr. Elcock: "The date at the top is 89- 11-01."
Ms. Meredith: "What does that equate to... November 1, 1989?"
Mr. Elcock: "Yes, it should do."
Ms. Meredith: "How is it possible that this message number and this
date can be an additional background on a document that is dated
October 17, 1989? How is it possible that this information is on a
document when it didn't exist at the time?"
Mr. Elcock: "The honourable member is concluding that it's the same
reference; I don't know that it is."
Ms. Meredith: "If that is not the report, then why was the report not
included in the Privacy request by Mr. Manning? This is the only
document that was in the information provided to him."
Mr. Elcock: "I will check and see what the date is and advise the
committee what the date of the document was."
Summary - The Reform Party did ask, in writing, for CSIS to confirm
the date of this message. At the time this dissenting opinion was
written, CSIS had not responded to our request. If this is the report
in question, then it lends credence to the suggestion that this form
4002 was re-written some time after October 17, 1989. It also suggests
that someone believed that the original justification for the
investigation was so weak, that additional information had to be
provided. If, on the other hand, there was documentation withheld from
Mr. Manning's Privacy request, one wonders what else has been
withheld. ;
III) The Altered Form 4002. If the inclusion of information from a
message that was not yet reported suggested that the form 4002 had
been re-written, another fact that supported this suggestion was that
the date on the top right corner of the document had been altered. The
Reform Party employed the services of forensic consultant, an expert
in the examination of questioned documents, who stated "as a matter of
information it should be noted that within the questioned handwritten
digital date #145;1989-10-17' on exhibit A1 (a), partially within and
immediately above the handwritten numbers there exist undecipherable
fragmentary markings foreign to the handwritten #145;1989-10-17'
numbers."
This information led to the following exchange:
Ms. Meredith: "Mr. Elcock, I want to bring your attention back to the
first page of form 4002 and I want you to look at the handwritten date
at the top, right-hand corner. That handwritten date was altered,
wasn't it? Tab #145;B'."
Mr. Elcock: "And it goes back, I think, to the piece that you had
asked... I noted that Mr. Archdeacon had indicated the piece had been
X-rayed and in fact there was another date underneath."
Ms. Meredith: "Can you tell the committee what the date was that was
underneath?"
Mr. Elcock: "The date was 1990...March 29, 1990."
Ms. Meredith: "Thank you, Mr. Elcock. I think that just proves what I
have considered, that this document was typed up in full with a
changed subject-matter on March 29, 1990; that this document did not
originate on October 17, 1989."
Mr. Elcock: "No, Mr. Chairman, I don't agree that it does."
Ms. Meredith: "Can you explain how the date March 29, 1990 would be at
the top of that file if that was not the case?"
Mr. Elcock: "At the time, often the dates on those files, on those
documents are left open and completed later when the documents are
first issued because they don't have a file number either when they're
first issued."
Ms. Meredith: "Mr. Elcock, so you want me to believe, you want this
committee to believe that they filled in the form, that the effective
date was put in at the bottom, the expiry date was put in at bottom,
that it was signed off and the date was put in at the bottom, but that
at the top it wasn't. Is that what you want this committee to
believe?"
Mr. Elcock: "I believe there was a mistake made. We believed that at
the time the typist entered the date and subsequently crossed out
because she had mistakenly entered it and they put back in the
appropriate date."
Summary - Although Mr. Elcock admitted that the form 4002 carried the
date March 29, 1990, he maintained that this was the original 4002
filled out on October 17, 1989. His argument that the date wasn't put
in because the document did not have a file number is extremely weak,
since the FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES form that was signed on
October 17, 1989 was filled out specifically to obtain a file number.
In the documents obtained by Mr. Manning under his Privacy Act
request, we know that the first N.S.R. message that was sent on this
file was dated October 17, 1989, and since a message can not be sent
without a file number, a file number was obviously assigned on this
date. It is highly unlikely that CSIS would wait an additional five
months to fill in the rest of this form. This admission also calls
into question the testimony of Mr. Archdeacon from May 15, 1996, who
first brought up the subject of having the form X-rayed, and then
stated the form was never changed. ;
IV) Both Documents filled out by the Same Individual. The last area of
questioning concerned the contention put forth by CSIS and SIRC, that
the error in captions occurred not with the form 4002, but when a
clerk made an error in filling out a second form, a FILE OPENING
REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES form. Mr. Elcock called this a "clerical
error".
In his May 15, 1996 testimony, Mr. Archdeacon went even further when
he stated, "this TARC was sent down to the Management Information
Section in CSIS... The clerk down there thought that the only name
that he had, and you've got to have a name on a file, the only name he
could see was Preston Manning. So he didn't write #145;Unknown
Contributor', he wrote #145;Preston Manning'. That was an error. He
shouldn't have done that." Again these sound like plausible
explanations. Plausible that is until one examines the forms.
The Reform Party and the Sub- Committee were somewhat hampered because
of the censoring of the documents, which deleted the names of the CSIS
employees who filled out these forms. We were instead forced to
examine the handwritten dates on both the form 4002 and the FILE
OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES form. It is apparent that they were
written by the same person. The Forensic Consultant, an expert in the
examination of questioned documents confirmed the similarities.
While it may have been plausible that a clerk put in the wrong caption
on the second form, it is absolutely ludicrous to suggest that an
intelligence officer in CSIS HQ would fill out a form 4002 to
authorize an investigation in one name, and then on the very same day
he would fill out a second form to obtain a file number, and use a
different caption. As absurd as that sounds, that is what the Director
of CSIS wanted us to believe.
Witness the following exchange:
Ms. Meredith: "And that this unit head authorized a TARC Level
investigation on #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston Manning's
Electoral Campaign?' Is that right? That is in essence what this is
all about, right, is that they authorized a TARC one on an
#145;Unknown Contributor.'"
Mr. Elcock: "An Unknown Contributor to Preston Manning's Electoral
Campaign, yes."
Ms. Meredith: "And that the problem originated or the problem was
picked up when somebody filled out the FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE
FILES, and then wrote in #145;Preston Manning.'"
Mr. Elcock: "Yes." Ms. Meredith: "It wasn't a clerk who filled out
those forms, was it?"
Mr. Elcock: "No, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure what the honourable
member's point is."
Ms. Meredith: "My point is that if you look at the date in the top
right- hand corner of the FILE OPENING REQUEST and you look at the
date under the authority section on the same form, the PEOPLE FILE,
FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES, and then you look at the date
which is hand-written in at the top of the form 4002, I would suggest,
Sir, that it's the same person that wrote these two documents, that
worked with these two documents. How is it possible that the same
person on one file can put #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston
Manning's Electoral Campaign' and on the other file, the very same
day, put #145;Preston Manning.' And that his unit head, in reviewing
these on the same day, wouldn't pick up the mistake."
Mr. Elcock: "I'm not -- the honourable ...."
Ms. Meredith: "These are things that, I'm sorry, how is it possible
that a Counterintelligence officer can mistakenly, this is who filled
out this form, is an intelligence officer in Counterintelligence. How
could he look at a TARC form that he also filled in and filled it in
with #145;Unknown Contributor to Preston Manning' and on the very same
day on another form put Preston Manning's name down?"
Mr. Elcock: "These things happen. Names are sometimes left in
documents when they ought not to be." Ms. Meredith: "And his unit
chief who is authorizing and okaying these didn't notice that one of
the forms was under Preston Manning's name?" Mr. Elcock: "I'm sure as
the honourable member will know, these things happen from time to
time."
Summary - Mr. Elcock's defence, given this information is simply that
these things happen. That is even more frightening than a planned
investigation of Mr. Manning. The Director of CSIS stated that he
wanted to re-assure the Reform Party that nothing untoward happened
with this file. Yet, the only explanation Mr. Elcock offers for the
conduct of his department, is that the employees who were involved in
this investigation were grossly incompetent?
However, the Reform Party has more faith in the ability of working
level staff at CSIS than the Director does. However, the Director did
confirm that the FILE OPENING REQUEST - PEOPLE FILES form was never
filled out by a clerk in the Information Management Section of CSIS.
That begs the question: Why did the Executive Director of SIRC, Mr.
Archdeacon, make up his story to mislead the Sub-Committee? ;
CONCLUSIONS The Reform Party regrets having to present such a
painstakingly, detailed review of the Preston Manning investigation,
but it was necessary to demonstrate the extreme lengths that we have
had to go to in our attempts to find the truth in this matter.
The documents obtained by Mr. Manning through his Privacy Act request
afforded us the opportunity to challenge SIRC's version of events
directly. SIRC has demonstrated that their word cannot be accepted at
face value. But what does this all mean in the final analysis?
Two issues need to be resolved. The first is what initiated the
October 17, 1989 TARC Level 1 investigation. Since the South African
desk in CSIS HQ wrote off any investigation on January 10, 1989, what
suddenly spawned interest nine months later. One would think that it
would be logical for someone to have something in writing suggesting
that an investigation be opened. But that didn't happen.
The questions that remains unanswered, are:
Who ordered this matter re-opened, and why? The other issue that must
be answered is: Why are CSIS and SIRC going to such extreme lengths to
mislead the Sub-Committee, Parliament, and Canadians? If they had
maintained their original explanation that the file caption was
inappropriately opened in the name of #145;Preston Manning', and
subsequently changed, the Reform Party would have little to complain
about. But for CSIS and SIRC to retract all their previous admissions
without explanations, and to out-and-out lie to a Parliamentary
Sub-Committee, it is clear that there is something important they are
hiding.
The question is: What? Contrary to the assurances from SIRC and CSIS,
the Reform Party has learned that from October 17, 1989 to January 17,
1990, it was recorded in CSIS' main database, N.S.R., that there was a
TARC Level 1 on Preston Manning. There was no restricted security on
this file, so this information was available to any CSIS employee who
had access to N.S.R.
Any employee who came across this information would have believed that
there was a legal TARC Level on Manning, and could have legitimately
carried out a Level 1 investigation. If the government members of the
Sub-Committee weren't so intent on burying this report, the Sub-
Committee itself may have been able to produce some of its own
answers.
However, it became apparent, especially after the Liberals changed the
membership of the Sub-Committee, that government members are just as
interested in covering up the truth, as are CSIS and SIRC. This is
typified by the member from Windsor - St. Clair's vociferous objection
to the Bloc Quebecois attempting to give their time to question the
Director of CSIS to the Reform Party at the May 27, 1996 meeting. Why
else would they object to the Reform Party having a few extra minutes
to ask questions?
It is clear to the Reform Party that SIRC's Heritage Front Affair
report is a complete whitewash. SIRC was able to divert what should
have been a review of the activities of a CSIS Source into a review of
the Heritage Front itself. Both SIRC and CSIS champion this case as a
great success for the Service, but the mere fact that the Source's own
actions made this case public, should suggest it was a failure. But
what this case has done is to show that the review system established
by the CSIS Act does not work.
The government has joined with CSIS and SIRC in covering up the truth.
Why? What are they afraid of? This government has expressed no concern
that the leader of a legitimate political party had his name on a
document authorizing a CSIS investigation on him. They have expressed
no concern that all the original documents authorizing that
investigation were altered in one manner or another. They have shown
no concern that both CSIS and SIRC admitted that originally the TARC
level was on Preston Manning, then fifteen months later proceeded to
deny it, with absolutely no explanation.
It would appear that this government is not interested in holding the
bureaucracy accountable. How is it possible that the government is not
concerned that one of its agencies operates without accountability.
Was that not why a civilian intelligence agency was formed? Did not a
previous Liberal administration pass the CSIS Act, to make Canada's
intelligence community accountable to Parliament?
Those Canadians who care about the truth will have to wait until this
country has a government committed to Parliamentary accountability,
before the true version comes out. In the meantime, the Reform Party
hopes that those journalists, researchers or academics who are
interested in pursuing security issues continue their search for the
real story. The truth is out there!
RECOMMENDATIONS In light of the negligent performance of the Security
Intelligence Review Committee in reviewing this investigation, it is
clear that there is no place in the review process for a group of
patronage appointees who believe that they do not have to answer to
Parliament.
To find an alternative we need look no further than to our neighbours
to the south. The Americans utilize not only a House Select Committee
on Intelligence, but a Senate Committee as well. Given the immense
Intelligence network in the United States with the CIA, the NSA and
the Intelligence Division of the FBI, the Americans have demonstrated
that review by elected representatives is not only workable, but in
the Reform Party's opinion is preferable. ;
Reform Party Recommendation The Reform Party recommends that this
government introduce legislation in Parliament that would amend the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, deleting all references to
the Security Intelligence Review Committee. All references to the
Security Intelligence Review Committee should be replaced by the
Standing Committee on National Security. ;
; Created by Maurice Murphy Revised: December 01, 1996

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